Temptation and self-control for the impure benevolent planner: The case of heterogeneous discounting

Hayashi, T. , Kiguchi, N. and Takeoka, N. (2024) Temptation and self-control for the impure benevolent planner: The case of heterogeneous discounting. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 26(1), e12674. (doi: 10.1111/jpet.12674)

[img] Text
308870.pdf - Published Version
Available under License Creative Commons Attribution.



This paper presents a “behavioral” model of a normative benevolent social planner, who faces a self-control problem when he/she is in charge of aggregating diverse and conflicting preferences of individuals. The model is presented in the context of aggregating preferences over intertemporal streams of social outcomes, in which Zuber and Jackson and Yariv have shown the impossibility of a time-consistent and Paretian social objective function. Unlike previous studies, our investigation focuses on the compatibility of the Pareto condition with the impure social planner who has a dynamically consistent self-control utility function characterized by Gul and Pesendorfer. Assuming that the social planner is tempted to adopt the majority's opinion when there is a conflict of opinions among individuals, the paper characterizes an aggregation form in which the planner is allowed to depart from dictatorship in ex-post choice under noncommitment.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Hayashi, Professor Takashi
Authors: Hayashi, T., Kiguchi, N., and Takeoka, N.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
Journal Name:Journal of Public Economic Theory
ISSN (Online):1467-9779
Published Online:10 December 2023
Copyright Holders:Copyright: © 2023 The Authors
First Published:First published in Journal of Public Economic Theory 26(1): e12674
Publisher Policy:Reproduced under a Creative Commons licence

University Staff: Request a correction | Enlighten Editors: Update this record