Signal-jamming in the frequency domain

Taub, B. (2023) Signal-jamming in the frequency domain. Games and Economic Behavior, 142, pp. 896-930. (doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.10.006)

Abstract

I examine strategic behavior for a duopoly in a noisy environment. Firms attempt to learn the value of the rival's privately observed demand shocks via a noisy signal of price, and at the same time firms attempt to obfuscate that signal by producing excess output on the publicly observable signals, that is, they signal jam. In a dynamic setting firms also distort the intertemporal structure of output keyed to the publicly observable demand shock process in order to disguise their private shocks. The net outcome is to radically increase the persistence of elements of output over their full-information value, but also to reduce the persistence of price over its full-information value; this latter effect is “inconspicuousness.”

• Item Type: Articles
• Additional Information: Bart Taub reports financial support and administrative support were provided by National Research University Higher School of Economics. I acknowledge financial support from the Academic Excellence Project “5-100” of the Russian Government. Additional research was carried out at the European University Institute, Florence, with the support of a Fernand Braudel Fellowship.
• Keywords: Dynamic games, signal jamming, strategic information, frequency domain methods.
• Status: Published
• Refereed: Yes
• Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: Taub, Professor Bart
• Authors: Taub, B.
• Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
• College/School: College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
• Journal Name: Games and Economic Behavior
• Publisher: Elsevier
• ISSN: 0899-8256
• ISSN (Online): 1090-2473
• Published Online: 21 October 2023
• Copyright Holders: Copyright © 2023 The Author(s)
• First Published: First published in Games and Economic Behavior 142:896-930
• Publisher Policy: Reproduced under a Creative Commons license