A simple matching domain with indifferences and a master list

Chowdhury, R. (2023) A simple matching domain with indifferences and a master list. Review of Economic Design, 27(2), pp. 287-311. (doi: 10.1007/s10058-022-00292-9)

Abstract

We present a two-sided one-to-one market setting where one side of the market is objectively ranked. Constraints prevent agents on the other side from matching with agents who are ranked higher than an agent-specific threshold. The domain allows for indifferences, with preferences of one side being derived from a master preference list, while agents on the other side have general preferences. We analyze matchings with respect to two standard properties: stability and efficiency. Having met these standard goals, the designer facing this problem may additionally care about a third criterion: the size of the matching. We find that for the proposed domain all stable matchings have the same size. We characterize the set of stable and efficient matchings for the problem. Our results show that every matching that is both stable and efficient is hierarchical by nature in a precise sense.

• Item Type: Articles
• Additional Information: This work was supported by the College of Social Science Scholarship, University of Glasgow.
• Status: Published
• Refereed: Yes
• Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: Chowdhury, Rohan
• Authors: Chowdhury, R.
• College/School: College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School
• Journal Name: Review of Economic Design
• Publisher: Springer
• ISSN: 1434-4742
• ISSN (Online): 1434-4750
• Published Online: 18 February 2022
• Copyright Holders: Copyright © 2022 The Author
• First Published: First published in Review of Economic Design 27(): 287-311
• Publisher Policy: Reproduced under a Creative Commons License