Limits to rational learning

Levy, Y. J. (2015) Limits to rational learning. Journal of Economic Theory, 160, pp. 1-23. (doi: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.08.001)

Abstract

A long-standing open question raised in the seminal paper of Kalai and Lehrer (1993) is whether or not the play of a repeated game, in the rational learning model introduced there, must eventually resemble the play of exact equilibria, and not just the play of approximate equilibria as demonstrated there. This paper shows that play may remain distant – in fact, mutually singular – from the play of any equilibrium of the repeated game. We further show that the same inaccessibility holds in Bayesian games, where the play of a Bayesian equilibrium may continue to remain distant from the play of any equilibrium of the true game.

• Item Type: Articles
• Status: Published
• Refereed: Yes
• Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: Levy, Dr John
• Authors: Levy, Y. J.
• College/School: College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
• Journal Name: Journal of Economic Theory
• Publisher: Elsevier
• ISSN: 0022-0531
• ISSN (Online): 1095-7235
• Published Online: 17 August 2015
• Copyright Holders: Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Inc
• First Published: First published in Journal of Economic Theory 160:1-23
• Publisher Policy: Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy