The problem of universals and the limits of truth-making

MacBride, F. (2002) The problem of universals and the limits of truth-making. Philosophical Papers, 31(1), pp. 27-37. (doi: 10.1080/05568640209485093)

Abstract

There is no single problem of universals but a family of difficulties that treat of a variety of interwoven metaphysical, epistemological, logical and semantic themes. This makes the problem of universals resistant to canonical reduction (to a ‘once-and-for-all’ concern). In particular, the problem of universals cannot be reduced to the problem of supplying truth-makers for sentences that express sameness of type. This is (in part) because the conceptual distinction between numerical and qualitative identity must first be drawn before a sentence is eligible to be supplied with truth-makers. The case is made through a consideration of a recent argument by Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra.

• Item Type: Articles
• Status: Published
• Refereed: Yes
• Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: Macbride, Professor Fraser
• Authors: MacBride, F.
• College/School: College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
• Journal Name: Philosophical Papers
• Publisher: Taylor and Francis (Routledge)
• ISSN: 0556-8641
• ISSN (Online): 1996-8523