Kemp, G. (2014) Hyperintensional truth conditions (reply to Ian Rumfitt). Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 88(1), pp. 57-68. (doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8349.2014.00232.x)
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Publisher's URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8349.2014.00232.x
Abstract
A response to certain parts of Rumfitt (2014): I defend Davidson's project in semantics, suggest that Rumfitt's use of sentential quantification renders his definition of truth needlessly elaborate, and pose a question for Rumfitt's handling of the strengthened Liar.
Item Type: | Articles |
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Status: | Published |
Refereed: | Yes |
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Kemp, Dr Gary |
Authors: | Kemp, G. |
Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BC Logic |
College/School: | College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy |
Journal Name: | Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume |
Publisher: | The Aristotelian Society |
ISSN: | 0309-7013 |
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