Moulin, H. and Vial, J. -P. (1978) Strategically zero-sum games: the class of games whose completely mixed equilibria cannot be improved upon. International Journal of Game Theory, 7(3-4), pp. 201-221. (doi: 10.1007/BF01769190)
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Abstract
In this paper we propose a new class of games, the “strategically zero-sum games,” which are characterized by a special payoff structure. We show that for a large body of correlation schemes which includes the correlated strategies “à la Aumann”, strategically zero-sum games are exactly these games for which no completely mixed Nash equilibrium can be improved upon.
| Item Type: | Articles |
|---|---|
| Status: | Published |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Moulin, Professor Herve |
| Authors: | Moulin, H., and Vial, J. -P. |
| College/School: | College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics |
| Journal Name: | International Journal of Game Theory |
| ISSN: | 0020-7276 |
| ISSN (Online): | 1432-1270 |
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