Implementing efficient, anonymous and neutral social choice functions

Moulin, H. (1980) Implementing efficient, anonymous and neutral social choice functions. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 7(3), pp. 249-269. (doi: 10.1016/0304-4068(80)90012-9)

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Implementing a social choice function is to endow the agents involved in a collective decision problem with a privately owned decision power, in such a way that by exercising (noncooperatively) this power the agents eventually select the very outcome recommended by the social choice function.<p></p> In this paper, we show that the concept of dominance-solvable voting scheme allows the implementation of some of the most desirable social choice functions. Namely our main result is the following: If the number of agents n is a prime integer strictly greater than the number of outcomes p then there exists at least one efficient, anonymous and neutral social choice function, in short eanscf, that can be implemented by a dominance-solvable voting scheme. The result is proved constructively, i.e., by looking at a repeated version of voting by veto that is by itself an appealing voting scheme. The arithmetic condition (n should be prime and greater than p) is very natural (since it does not exist an eanscf unless every prime factor of n is greater than p).

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Moulin, Professor Herve
Authors: Moulin, H.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
Journal Name:Journal of Mathematical Economics
ISSN (Online):1873-1538

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