Moulin, H. (1982) Voting with proportional veto power. Econometrica, 50(1), pp. 145-162. (doi: 10.2307/1912535)
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Abstract
We give necessary conditions for a neutral social choice function to be partially implementable by means of a strong equilibrium (i.e., implementable by cooperative agents): the veto power of the various coalitions should be maximally distributed. If moreover the social choice function is veto-anonymous, then the veto power of a coalition must be (roughly) proportional to its size: x per cent of the agents have the power to veto x per cent of the candidates. The procedure of "voting by successive veto" is an example of a neutral and (nearly) veto-anonymous social choice function which is implementable.
Item Type: | Articles |
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Status: | Published |
Refereed: | Yes |
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Moulin, Professor Herve |
Authors: | Moulin, H. |
College/School: | College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics |
Journal Name: | Econometrica |
ISSN: | 0012-9682 |
ISSN (Online): | 1468-0262 |
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