Moulin, H. (1982) Non-cooperative implementation: a survey of recent results. Mathematical Social Sciences, 3(3), pp. 243-257. (doi: 10.1016/0165-4896(82)90073-7)
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Abstract
Strategic decentralization of collective decision-making is considered when the agents' behaviour is non-cooperative. Specifically they use dominant, maximin risk-avert or sophisticated strategies. The existing results applying these equilibrium concepts are reviewed in three familiar economically meaningful contexts: ordinal (as in voting), random (as in bargaining) and quasilinear (as in public goods problems).
Item Type: | Articles |
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Status: | Published |
Refereed: | Yes |
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Moulin, Professor Herve |
Authors: | Moulin, H. |
College/School: | College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics |
Journal Name: | Mathematical Social Sciences |
ISSN: | 0165-4896 |
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