Moulin, H. (1985) From social welfare ordering to acyclic aggregation of preferences. Mathematical Social Sciences, 9(1), pp. 1-17. (doi: 10.1016/0165-4896(85)90002-2)
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Abstract
One way to overcome Arrow's impossibility theorem is to drop the requirement that the collective preference be transitive. If it is quasi-transitive (strict preferences are transitive) an oligarchy emerges. If it is only acyclic, many non-oligarchic aggregation rules are available, yet the resulting decision rules are poorly decisive: Nakamura's theorem characterizes acyclic and neutral Arrowian aggregators. We propose a parallel characterization of acyclic and anonymous aggregation methods.
| Item Type: | Articles |
|---|---|
| Status: | Published |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Moulin, Professor Herve |
| Authors: | Moulin, H. |
| College/School: | College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics |
| Journal Name: | Mathematical Social Sciences |
| ISSN: | 0165-4896 |
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