Moulin, H. (1990) Uniform externalities. Journal of Public Economics, 43(3), pp. 305-326. (doi: 10.1016/0047-2727(90)90003-Z)
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Abstract
Positive (resp. negative) Preference Externalities say that an agent always prefers his actual welfare to his (virtual) welfare should other agents share his preferences (resp. prefers his virtual to his actual welfare). Negative Group Externalities say that an agent never prefers his actual welfare to his (virtual) welfare should he be the sole user of the resources.<p></p> These two axioms unify several familiar fairness properties - and yield some new ideas as well - in the division of unproduced commodities and the cooperative production of a private or a public good. We also discuss their compatibility with No Envy and Resource Monotonicity.
| Item Type: | Articles |
|---|---|
| Status: | Published |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Moulin, Professor Herve |
| Authors: | Moulin, H. |
| College/School: | College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics |
| Journal Name: | Journal of Public Economics |
| ISSN: | 0047-2727 |
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