Bogomolnaia, A. and Moulin, H. (2004) Random matching under dichotomous preferences. Econometrica, 72(1), pp. 257-279. (doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00483.x)
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Abstract
<br>We consider bilateral matching problems where each person views those on the other side of the market as either acceptable or unacceptable: an acceptable mate is preferred to remaining single, and the latter to an unacceptable mate; all acceptable mates are welfare-wise identical.</br> <br>Using randomization, many efficient and fair matching methods define strategyproof revelation mechanisms. Randomly selecting a priority ordering of the participants is a simple example. Equalizing as much as possible the probability of getting an acceptable mate across all participants stands out for its normative and incentives properties: the profile of probabilities is Lorenz dominant, and the revelation mechanism is groupstrategyproof for each side of the market.</br>
| Item Type: | Articles |
|---|---|
| Status: | Published |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Bogomolnaia, Professor Anna and Moulin, Professor Herve |
| Authors: | Bogomolnaia, A., and Moulin, H. |
| College/School: | College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics |
| Journal Name: | Econometrica |
| ISSN: | 0012-9682 |
| ISSN (Online): | 1468-0262 |
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