Bogomolnaia, A. , Moulin, H. and Stong, R. (2005) Collective choice under dichotomous preferences. Journal of Economic Theory, 122(2), pp. 165-184. (doi: 10.1016/j.jet.2004.05.005)
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Abstract
<br>Agents partition deterministic outcomes into good or bad. A mechanism selects a lottery over outcomes (time-shares). The probability of a good outcome is the canonical utility. The utilitarian mechanism averages over outcomes with largest "approval". It is efficient, strategyproof, anonymous and neutral.</br> <br>We reach an impossibility if, in addition, each agent's utility is at least , where n is the number of agents; or is at least the fraction of good to feasible outcomes. We conjecture that no ex ante efficient and strategyproof mechanism guarantees a strictly positive utility to all agents, and prove a weaker statement.</br>
| Item Type: | Articles |
|---|---|
| Status: | Published |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Bogomolnaia, Professor Anna and Moulin, Professor Herve |
| Authors: | Bogomolnaia, A., Moulin, H., and Stong, R. |
| College/School: | College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics |
| Journal Name: | Journal of Economic Theory |
| Publisher: | Elsevier |
| ISSN: | 0022-0531 |
| ISSN (Online): | 1095-7235 |
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