MacBride, F. (2013) For keeping truth in truthmaking. Analysis, 73(4), pp. 686-695. (doi: 10.1093/analys/ant073)
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Abstract
Is the truthmaker principle a development of the correspondence theory of truth? So Armstrong introduced the truthmaker principle to us, but Lewis (2001) influentially argued that it is neither a correspondence theory nor a theory of truth. But the truthmaker principle can be correctly understood as a development of the correspondence theory if it’s conceived as incorporating the insight that truth is a relation between truth-bearers and something worldly. And we strengthen rather than weaken the plausibility of the truthmaker principle if we conceive of truth as performing a substantial rather than deflationary role in the truthmaker principle.
| Item Type: | Articles |
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| Additional Information: | This article has been accepted for publication in Analysis ©: 2013 The Author. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Trust. All rights reserved. |
| Keywords: | truthmakers, truth, Armstrong, Bigelow, Lewis. |
| Status: | Published |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Macbride, Professor Fraser |
| Authors: | MacBride, F. |
| Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) |
| College/School: | College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy |
| Journal Name: | Analysis |
| Publisher: | Oxford University Press |
| ISSN: | 0003-2638 |
| ISSN (Online): | 1467-8284 |
| Copyright Holders: | Copyright © 2013 The Author |
| First Published: | First published in Analysis 73(4):686-695 |
| Publisher Policy: | Reproduced in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher |
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