Decision rules revealing commonly known events

Mylovanov, T. and Zapechelnyuk, A. (2013) Decision rules revealing commonly known events. Economics Letters, 119(1), pp. 8-10. (doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.01.002)

Abstract

We provide a sufficient condition under which an uninformed principal can infer any information that is common knowledge among two experts, regardless of the structure of the parties’ beliefs. The condition requires that the bias of each expert is less than the radius of the smallest ball containing the action space.

• Item Type: Articles
• Status: Published
• Refereed: Yes
• Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: Zapechelnyuk, Professor Andriy
• Authors: Mylovanov, T., and Zapechelnyuk, A.
• College/School: College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
• Journal Name: Economics Letters
• ISSN: 0165-1765