Optimal mechanisms for an auction mediator

Matros, A. and Zapechelnyuk, A. (2011) Optimal mechanisms for an auction mediator. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 29(4), pp. 426-431. (doi: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2010.08.004)

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We consider a dynamic auction environment with a long-lived seller and short-lived buyers mediated by a third party. A mediator has incomplete information about traders’ values and selects an auction mechanism to maximize her expected revenue. We characterize mediator–optimal mechanisms and show that an optimal mechanism has a simple implementation as a Vickrey auction with a reserve price where the seller pays to the mediator only a fixed percentage from the closing price.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Zapechelnyuk, Professor Andriy
Authors: Matros, A., and Zapechelnyuk, A.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
Journal Name:International Journal of Industrial Organization

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