Tauman, Y. and Zapechelnyuk, A. (2010) On (non-) monotonicity of cooperative solutions. International Journal of Game Theory, 39(1-2), pp. 171-175. (doi: 10.1007/s00182-009-0196-z)
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Abstract
Aggregate monotonicity of cooperative solutions is widely accepted as a desirable property, and examples where certain solution concepts (such as the nucleolus) violate this property are scarce and have no economic interpretation. We provide an example of a simple four-player game that points out at a class of economic contexts where aggregate monotonicity is not appealing.
| Item Type: | Articles |
|---|---|
| Status: | Published |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Zapechelnyuk, Professor Andriy |
| Authors: | Tauman, Y., and Zapechelnyuk, A. |
| College/School: | College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics |
| Journal Name: | International Journal of Game Theory |
| ISSN: | 0020-7276 |
| ISSN (Online): | 1432-1270 |
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