On (non-) monotonicity of cooperative solutions

Tauman, Y. and Zapechelnyuk, A. (2010) On (non-) monotonicity of cooperative solutions. International Journal of Game Theory, 39(1-2), pp. 171-175. (doi: 10.1007/s00182-009-0196-z)

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Aggregate monotonicity of cooperative solutions is widely accepted as a desirable property, and examples where certain solution concepts (such as the nucleolus) violate this property are scarce and have no economic interpretation. We provide an example of a simple four-player game that points out at a class of economic contexts where aggregate monotonicity is not appealing.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Zapechelnyuk, Professor Andriy
Authors: Tauman, Y., and Zapechelnyuk, A.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
Journal Name:International Journal of Game Theory
ISSN (Online):1432-1270

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