Optimal fees in internet auctions

Matros, A. and Zapechelnyuk, A. (2008) Optimal fees in internet auctions. Review of Economic Design, 12(3), pp. 155-163. (doi: 10.1007/s10058-008-0044-9)

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An auction house runs a second-price auction with a possibility of resale through re-auctions. It collects listing and closing fees from the seller. We find the fees which maximize the revenue of the auction house. In particular, we show that the optimal listing fee is zero. Our findings are consistent with the policies of eBay, Amazon, Yahoo, and other Internet auctions.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Zapechelnyuk, Professor Andriy
Authors: Matros, A., and Zapechelnyuk, A.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
Journal Name:Review of Economic Design
ISSN (Online):1434-4750

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