Strategic complements and substitutes, and potential games

Dubey, P., Haimanko, O. and Zapechelnyuk, A. (2006) Strategic complements and substitutes, and potential games. Games and Economic Behavior, 54(1), pp. 77-94. (doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2004.10.007)

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<p>We show that games of strategic complements, or substitutes, with aggregation are “pseudo-potential” games. The upshot is that they possess Nash equilibria in pure strategies (NE), even if the strategy sets are not convex; and that various dynamic processes converge to NE. In particular, NE exist in Cournot oligopoly with indivisibilities in production.</p> <p>Our notion of aggregation is quite general and enables us to take a unified view of several disparate models.</p>

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Zapechelnyuk, Professor Andriy
Authors: Dubey, P., Haimanko, O., and Zapechelnyuk, A.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
Journal Name:Games and Economic Behavior
Publisher:Academic Press

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