Stability of jurisdiction structures under the equal share and median rules

Bogomolnaia, A. , Le Breton, M., Savvateev, A. and Weber, S. (2008) Stability of jurisdiction structures under the equal share and median rules. Economic Theory, 34(3), pp. 525-543. (doi: 10.1007/s00199-006-0198-z)

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Abstract

We consider a finite society with of individuals distributed along the real line. The individuals form jurisdictions to consume public projects, equally share their costs and, in addition, bear a transportation cost to the location of the project. We examine a core and Nash notions of stable jurisdiction structures and show that in hedonic games both solution sets could be empty. We demonstrate that in a quasi-hedonic set-up there is a Nash stable partition, but, in general, there are no core stable partitions. We then examine a subclass of societies that admits the existence of both types of stable partitions.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Bogomolnaia, Professor Anna
Authors: Bogomolnaia, A., Le Breton, M., Savvateev, A., and Weber, S.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
Journal Name:Economic Theory
Publisher:Springer-Verlag
ISSN:0938-2259
ISSN (Online):1432-0479

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