Samesaying, propositions, and radical interpretation

Kemp, G. (2001) Samesaying, propositions, and radical interpretation. Ratio, 14(2), pp. 131-152. (doi: 10.1111/1467-9329.00151)

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Davidson's paratactic account of indirect quotation preserves the apparent relational structure of indirect speech but without assuming, in the Fregean manner, that the thing said by a sayer is a proposition. I argue that this is a mistake. As has been recognised by some critics, Davidson's account suffers from analytical shortcomings which can be overcome by redeploying the paratactic strategy as a means of referring to propositions. I offer a quick and comprehensive survey of these difficulties and a concise propositional solution. Further, I argue that Davidson's more general philosophical commitments provide no reason not to embrace the propositional strategy: despite appearances, to invoke propositions in the way suggested is consistent with Davidson's holism and consequent doctrine of semantic indeterminacy.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Kemp, Dr Gary
Authors: Kemp, G.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
College/School:College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Ratio
Published Online:17 December 2002

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