Kemp, G. (2001) Samesaying, propositions, and radical interpretation. Ratio, 14(2), pp. 131-152. (doi: 10.1111/1467-9329.00151)
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Publisher's URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9329.00151
Abstract
Davidson's paratactic account of indirect quotation preserves the apparent relational structure of indirect speech but without assuming, in the Fregean manner, that the thing said by a sayer is a proposition. I argue that this is a mistake. As has been recognised by some critics, Davidson's account suffers from analytical shortcomings which can be overcome by redeploying the paratactic strategy as a means of referring to propositions. I offer a quick and comprehensive survey of these difficulties and a concise propositional solution. Further, I argue that Davidson's more general philosophical commitments provide no reason not to embrace the propositional strategy: despite appearances, to invoke propositions in the way suggested is consistent with Davidson's holism and consequent doctrine of semantic indeterminacy.
| Item Type: | Articles |
|---|---|
| Status: | Published |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Kemp, Dr Gary |
| Authors: | Kemp, G. |
| Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) |
| College/School: | College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy |
| Journal Name: | Ratio |
| ISSN: | 0034-0006| |
| Published Online: | 17 December 2002 |
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