Some worries about normative and metaethical sentimentalism

Brady, M.S. (2003) Some worries about normative and metaethical sentimentalism. Metaphilosophy, 34(1-2), pp. 144-153. (doi: 10.1111/1467-9973.00265)

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In this response I raise a number of problems for Michael Slote's normative and metaethical sentimentalism. The first is that his agent–based account of rightness needs be qualified in order to be plausible; any such qualification, however, leaves Slote's normative ethics in tension with his metaethical views. The second is that an agent–based ethics of empathic caring will indeed struggle to capture our common–sense understanding of deontological constraints, and that appeal to the notion of causal immediacy will be of little help here. Finally, it seems to me that Slote's metaethical account will turn out to be much less externalist (and hence, by his own lights, much less plausible) than he suspects.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Brady, Professor Michael
Authors: Brady, M.S.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BJ Ethics
College/School:College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Metaphilosophy
Published Online:09 January 2004

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