McDowell and the presentation of pains

Bain, D.T. (2009) McDowell and the presentation of pains. Philosophical Topics, 37(1), pp. 1-24. (doi: 10.5840/philtopics200937113)

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It can seem natural to say that, when in pain, we undergo experiences which present to us certain experience-dependent particulars, namely pains. As part of his wider approach to mind and world, John McDowell has elaborated an interesting but neglected version of this account of pain. Here I set out McDowell’s account at length, and place it in context. I argue that his subjectivist conception of the objects of pain experience is incompatible with his requirement that such experience be presentational, rationalizing, and classificatory.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Bain, Dr David
Authors: Bain, D.T.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
College/School:College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Philosophical Topics
ISSN (Online):2154-154X

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