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# Non-competitive Elections and National Politics: The USSR Supreme Soviet Elections of 1984

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Elections to the 'eleventh convocation' of the USSR Supreme Soviet took place on 4 March 1984. The process by which the elections took place is examined in detail, from the calling of the election on 16 December 1983, through the nomination, approval and registration of the candidates, to the pre-election meetings with constituents and the poll itself. The level of turnout (99.99 per cent) and the vote in favour of the single list of candidates (99.94 and 99.95 per cent respectively for the two chambers) were in each case the highest in Soviet history; they must, however, be adjusted for the use of 'absentee certificates' and an apparent increase in the number of citizens not recorded on the electoral register. Elections without choice, as in the USSR, are not necessarily elections without political significance. Soviet elections appear in fact to perform at least three important functions: legitimation; political communication between regime and citizenry; and political mobilization and socialization. Given the increasing economic difficulties they are likely to face in the later 1980s and beyond, the Soviet authorities may be expected to make even more use of such mechanisms in the future in order to secure acceptance of their decisions without resort to overtly coercive means.

Unlike, for instance, the major fascist dictatorships, the USSR and the other communist countries have always based their legitimacy upon the doctrine of popular sovereignty and, by extension, upon the electoral process as a means by which that sovereignty may at least notionally be expressed.<sup>1</sup> 'All power in the USSR belongs to the people', as the Soviet Constitution declares in article 2; this power is exercised by the soviets of people's deputies, which constitute the 'political foundation of the USSR', and to which all other state bodies are subordinate and accountable. The doctrine of democratic centralism, upon which the Soviet state is organized, includes not only the obligation of lower bodies to observe the decisions of higher ones but also the 'electiveness of all bodies of state authority from the lowest to the highest' and their 'accountability to the people' (article 3). Elections, the Constitution also makes clear, shall be universal, equal, direct and secret: all citizens over the age of 18 (except the 'legally certified insane') enjoy the right to vote; and any restriction upon the exercise of those electoral rights from whatever quarter is prohibited (articles 95–99).<sup>2</sup> The same provisions are repeated in the Law on Elections to the USSR Supreme Soviet, adopted in 1978, which also specifies that men and women shall have equal electoral rights, that military servicemen shall have the same electoral rights as other citizens, and

that any attempt to restrict the exercise of electoral rights for reasons of social or property status, religious or national affiliation, language or any other cause is inadmissible.<sup>3</sup>

Soviet democracy, for reasons such as these, is typically described in Soviet sources as not simply different from, but on a qualitatively higher level than the limited and formalistic class democracy practised in capitalist and other non-socialist countries. In a class society, explains a recently published *Short Political Dictionary*, democracy is inevitably an expression of the dictatorship of the ruling class. In such societies, whether they are slave-owning, feudal or bourgeois (the most advanced), democracy serves the interests of the class in whose hands the means of production and political power are concentrated, respectively the slave-owners, feudalists and bourgeoisie. In a socialist society, by contrast, political democracy is based upon the social ownership of the means of production, which is the only reliable basis for the elimination of inequality between citizens and the establishment of genuine freedom. Socialist democracy, the *Dictionary* suggests, is in fact the highest form of political democracy, and provides its citizens, for the first time in the history of civilization, with the ability to participate universally and effectively not only in elections to state bodies, but also in the direction of their affairs. Socialist democracy 'guarantees all citizens real equality before the law, and genuinely direct and equal electoral rights (with a secret ballot)'; more generally an electoral system of the Soviet type is held to provide all citizens with 'complete freedom to express their wishes', unlike the electoral systems of bourgeois countries which apply a whole series of qualifications (property, residence and so forth) that limit or altogether deprive millions of citizens of the franchise. An electoral system of the Soviet type is in fact held to be the only type of system which not simply abstractly proclaims, but actually guarantees a genuine democracy to the mass of its citizens.<sup>4</sup>

Perhaps not surprisingly, affirmations of this kind have not always been taken seriously by scholars or mass publics in the West. It is pointed out, for instance, that although Soviet electoral law in fact prescribes no limitation, these are 'elections without choice',<sup>5</sup> in which the number of candidates is invariably the same as the number of seats available. Nor is this accidental. The right to nominate candidates, in the first place, is reserved for the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, for its youth organization, the Komsomol (Young Communist League), and for other public bodies such as the trade unions or co-operatives over which the party exercises effective control (Constitution, art. 100). Although the electoral law provides for the possibility of voting against the single candidate by crossing out his or her name, moreover (an unmarked ballot paper is counted as a vote in favour), this in practice requires voters to make use of the screened-off booth at the side of the polling station, where the usual facilities are available. This is hardly likely to encourage citizens to cast a vote against the candidates as often as they might otherwise wish.<sup>6</sup> Although there is again no formal requirement to this effect, a large majority of the candidates (usually about three-quarters at the national level) are members of the CPSU, and the party keeps a firm grip upon the whole process through its control of the electoral commissions, which supervise electoral arrangements at all levels. The Constitution even provides a facility for the retrospective correction of injudicious choices through the mechanism of recall, by which any deputy who has not 'justified the confidence of his electors' (in other words the party) may have his mandate revoked and another deputy elected in his place if a majority of electors in his constituency decide accordingly (art. 107).

Soviet elections, then, can scarcely be said to provide any opportunity for challenging the government or regime, still less any opportunity of replacing it; and yet this is not to suggest that they are of negligible importance to the functioning of the political system. They represent, in the first place, a formal assertion of the doctrine of popular sovereignty, upon whose basis all Soviet elected bodies are constituted and which remains central to the Soviet

conception of 'socialist democracy' and to the legitimation of the system more generally. In the second place, they provide a means of identifying the relative standing of members of the leadership, which is evident in the number of nominations and general prominence they receive during the electoral process, as well as a means of identifying the politically influential, whose standing is usually evident in their repeated election to legislative bodies and to important positions within them. Thirdly, and perhaps more important, they perform a significant communication and feedback function through the variety of means they make available, not simply for the leadership to mobilize the population towards the goals they have set forward, but also for the population to inform the leadership of their own particular priorities. The 1984 elections to the USSR Supreme Soviet provide a demonstration of the importance of both the authoritarian and the consultative features of an exercise of this kind in modern Soviet politics; in this paper I shall deal first with the electoral process itself, from the declaration of the date up to the election itself on 4 March 1984, and then go on to suggest some more general observations upon the role of elections within a political system of the Soviet type.

### The 1984 Election: From Declaration to Nomination

Under Soviet electoral law responsibility for calling elections belongs to the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, a body which serves as a standing committee of the legislature and collective presidency. Elections must be called not later than two months before the expiry of the powers of the outgoing Supreme Soviet; the Presidium is also responsible for the formation of electoral districts, a list of which must be published at the same time as the election itself is called (arts. 12 and 13). The previous Supreme Soviet, the 'Tenth Convocation', had been elected on 4 March 1979 for a five-year term of office (see Table 1). On 16 December 1983, accordingly, well in advance of the last permitted date, the Presidium adopted a decree calling elections for Sunday 4 March 1984, and simultaneously adopted a list of electoral constituencies for the 1,500 seats that were to be contested.<sup>7</sup> More detailed arrangements for elections in the USSR are the responsibility of electoral

TABLE 1. Elections to the USSR Supreme Soviet, 1937-84

Convocation	Date of election	No. of deputies	of which		Percentage poll	Percentage vote for candidates	
			CU	CN		CU	CN
First	12 Dec. 1937	1143	569	574	96.79	98.61	97.75
Second	10 Feb. 1946	1339	682	657	99.74	99.18	99.16
Third	12 Mar. 1950	1316	678	638	99.98	99.73	99.72
Fourth	14 Mar. 1954	1347	708	639	99.98	99.79	99.84
Fifth	16 Mar. 1958	1378	738	640	99.97	99.57	99.73
Sixth	18 Mar. 1962	1443	791	652	99.95	99.47	99.60
Seventh	12 Jun. 1966	1517	767	750	99.94	99.76	99.80
Eighth	14 Jun. 1970	1517	767	750	99.96	99.74	99.79
Ninth	16 Jun. 1974	1517	767	750	99.98	99.79	99.85
Tenth	4 Mar. 1979	1500	750	750	99.99	99.89	99.91
Eleventh	4 Mar. 1984	1500	750	750	99.99	99.94	99.95

Note: CU: Council of the Union; CN: Council of Nationalities

Sources: *Verkhovnyi Sovet SSSR devyatogo sozyva (statisticheskii sbornik)*, (Moscow, 1974), pp. 46-7; *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR*, no. 10, 7 March 1979, p. 162, and *ibid.*, no. 11, 14 March 1984, pp. 199-201.

commissions and ultimately of a Central Electoral Commission, consisting of a chairman, deputy chairman, secretary and 26 members, which must be set up not more than five days after the election itself has been called.<sup>8</sup> The formation of the CEC was approved on 22 December 1983, in fact a day later than the law provides; it was headed by Georgii Markov, first secretary of the Union of Soviet Writers, with Yegor Ligachev, head of the organizational-party work department of the CPSU Central Committee, in the strategic post of Secretary. Republican electoral commissions were also formed at about the same time, and local electoral commissions in each of the constituencies.<sup>9</sup>

Soviet elections, like all other manifestations of political life in the USSR, take place under the close scrutiny of the CPSU, and in particular of its leading organs. The Politburo had already discussed arrangements for the forthcoming elections at its weekly meeting on 16 December 1983, and had adopted a resolution on 'The tasks of party organisations in connection with the preparation and conduct of elections to the USSR Supreme Soviet of the eleventh convocation' which appeared in the national press on 20 December.<sup>10</sup> The resolution described the forthcoming elections as a 'major event in the socio-political life of the Soviet state' and urged party committees at all levels to ensure that they took place on a 'high organisational and ideo-political level', and in strict conformity with the Constitution and electoral law. Particular attention was to be paid to the mobilization of workers for the fulfilment of plan targets, to the economic and other achievements of the party, and to the 'peace-loving foreign policy' of the USSR. So far as the candidates themselves were concerned, 'genuinely authoritative people' were to be found, 'real popular representatives' who possessed the necessary political and practical qualities, enjoyed the respect of working people and were able to work with others. As before, workers and collective farmers were to be accorded the leading place among the candidates nominated, together with an 'appropriate representation' of other social groups and professions, women, youth, veterans, intermediate technical personnel, service workers, and members of minority national groups within each republic or other area. The evidence suggests that levels of representation of each of these groups are determined centrally, leaving the party and other organizations within each constituency with the task of finding individuals who conform to the appropriate requirements.<sup>11</sup>

Elections to the various levels of government occur fairly frequently in the USSR, and elaborate arrangements are made in each case for a vigorous 'campaign' to take place over the preceding two or three months under the overall guidance of party committees.<sup>12</sup> The Central Committee resolution of 20 December drew particular attention to the need for worker-activists and others to be enlisted in these activities, with the particular responsibility of explaining Soviet foreign and domestic policy and conducting 'individual work with voters' (or in other words canvassing them at their place of residence). Libraries, clubs, cinemas, sporting establishments and other institutions were also required to play their part, together with the mass media—newspapers, journals, radio and television—which were called upon to engage in the systematic publication of appropriate articles, books, posters and other material. The Central Committee resolution at the same time urged party and other organizations to ensure that a considerate and attentive attitude was taken towards the proposals, critical observations, complaints and statements of citizens that were received in the course of the electoral campaign; all should be properly recorded and considered, those that were constructive and realistic should be acted upon, and citizens should be informed in good time of the measures that had been taken.<sup>13</sup> In recent years increasing emphasis has been placed upon the participatory mechanisms that the Soviet system at least ostensibly provides, and the opportunities that elections make available, if not for a choice of candidate then at least for the expression of popular preferences and for a degree of apparent response

to them by deputies and officials, form part of this larger picture. The conduct of propaganda work is a rather more obvious feature of Soviet elections, at least to the outside observer, and here again clear guidelines were laid down at an early stage for the benefit of lecturers, propagandists and ideological officials at all levels.<sup>14</sup>

Following the setting of the date and the formation of electoral commissions, Soviet elections proceed through four main stages. First of all, the candidates must be nominated, a process which the electoral law specifies must begin ten days after the elections are called and must be completed thirty days before the election takes place (art. 38). The right to nominate is, as stated above, reserved for the Communist Party itself and for its youth organization, the Komsomol, for trade unions, co-operatives and other social organizations, for meetings of workers, and for meetings of servicemen in their military units. The nomination process duly began, within the limits prescribed by law, on 28 December 1983, and lasted for about two weeks, until 11 January 1984 (although there were as always some late nominations). This was followed by a series of district pre-election meetings attended by representatives of the nominating organizations, at which agreement was reached upon which of the candidates duly nominated should go forward for election. These began on 12 January and lasted until 28 January 1984. Reports have occasionally suggested that disagreements may occur at this stage, and that particularly unpopular candidates may be forced to withdraw. No reports of any pre-election meeting for elections to the 1984 USSR Supreme Soviet, however, suggested any disagreements of this kind; the emphasis in press commentaries was rather upon the 'monolithic unity' and 'unanimous support' that were supposed to have characterized this stage of the proceedings.<sup>15</sup>

Soviet electoral law in fact prescribes no limit to the number of candidates that may be nominated, and although no more than a single candidate has ever stood for election since the immediate pre-revolutionary period it has become customary for members of the political leadership to receive nominations for a large number of seats in addition to the constituency in which they eventually seek election. These additional, purely symbolic nominations serve to indicate the relative political standing of the members of the leadership who have been honoured in this way. The General Secretary, at this time Yuri Andropov, traditionally receives the largest number of nominations, followed by the other leaders in descending order of importance. For the 1984 elections Andropov received a total of 39 nominations, 38 of which were in addition to another candidate and one of which, for the Proletarsky district of Moscow, was a single nomination and evidently intended to be that for the constituency he would eventually represent. The then Central Committee Secretary and later party leader, Konstantin Chernenko, was in second place with a total of 13 nominations; the Soviet prime minister, Nikolai Tikhonov, came third with 12 nominations; Mikhail Gorbachev, another CC (and later General) Secretary, was nominated for 8 constituencies; his apparent rival and fellow Central Committee Secretary, Grigory Romanov, received 7 nominations; and defence minister Dmitri Ustinov registered the same total. Other full members of the Politburo received 5 or 6 nominations; candidate (non-voting) members of the Politburo received 3 or 4 nominations; and the remaining Central Committee Secretaries received 2, 3, or 4 nominations each. These figures for nominations were considerably lower than those recorded in earlier years; in 1970, for instance, the then General Secretary, Leonid Brezhnev, was nominated for no less than 138 different constituencies.<sup>16</sup> The relative number of nominations, none the less, still serves to indicate the political standing of the individual members of the party leadership, and in this connection it was notable that the relatively junior Gorbachev, 52 at this time, received a 'ranking' immediately after the established party and state leaders and ahead of his most obvious rival, Romanov.

Despite these gratifying totals, members of the Politburo, like other citizens, are permitted by the electoral law to stand for election in one constituency only (art. 42). On 28 January 1984, accordingly, the leadership circulated an 'Open Letter' to the district electoral commissions, expressing their 'heart-felt thanks' for the nominations they had received, but withdrawing in each case except for the single seat in which it had evidently been decided beforehand that they would stand, and in which they had been nominated as the single candidate.<sup>17</sup> Most Politburo members stood for the Council of the Union, the USSR's 'federal' chamber which represents the whole population on the basis of constituencies of equal population members, and most Central Committee Secretaries stood for the slightly less prestigious Council of Nationalities, the chamber which represents the population upon the basis of national-territorial units. Gorbachev, together with Andropov, Chernenko and others, was nominated for the Council of the Union; Romanov, however, once again suffered a minor slight in protocol terms by being the most prominent member of the leadership nominated for a constituency in the Council of Nationalities. All of this was in accordance with previous and well established practice. One earlier innovation, however, was not repeated in 1984: the attempt by two independent candidates, Roy Medvedev and Lyudmilla Agapova, to place their names upon the ballot paper on behalf of 'Election '79', an *ad hoc* group for the most part composed of dissident trade unionists. In the event the nominations were held to be invalid under the electoral law and in 1984 the experiment was not repeated.<sup>18</sup>

Nominations having been made and agreed at pre-election meetings, the third stage in the electoral process then begins: the registration of candidates, which according to the electoral law must take place between 25 and 35 days before the election itself (art. 42). This involves the lodging of documents with the district electoral commission which testify to the validity of the deputy's nomination, together with a statement by the deputy himself that he is willing to stand for election in the constituency for which he has been nominated (see above). The registration of candidates duly began on 28 January and concluded, in accordance with the law, on 7 February 1984.<sup>19</sup> The General Secretary is by convention the first to be registered for election in this way, and Andropov was duly endorsed as a deputy for the Proletarsky district of Moscow on 28 January, followed by other members of the leadership in descending order of importance and by the remaining candidates throughout the country. Under the electoral law social organizations and groups of workers, as well as individual citizens, are granted the right to conduct agitation on behalf of the candidates they have nominated, as well as the use of appropriate premises free of charge and access to the means of mass communications (art. 46). On 4 February 1984 the Central Committee of the CPSU led the way with an 'Appeal' to all electors to cast their votes for the bloc of communist and non-party candidates 'in order yet again to demonstrate their belief in the party's policy of communist creation and peace'.<sup>20</sup> Similar appeals were made by the Central Committee of the Komsomol to all young voters,<sup>21</sup> and by the Central Committee of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions to all trade union voters (over 133 million in total, about 98 per cent of the workforce or over 72 per cent of the electorate).<sup>22</sup> The electoral law does not provide for agitation against the candidates who have been nominated and in practice no organized opposition is permitted.

### The 1984 Election: From Pre-election Meetings to the Ballot

The fourth and final stage of the election began shortly afterwards: the pre-election meetings of candidates with voters, at which all candidates for election engage in a somewhat formalistic interchange with the electors in the constituencies for which they have been



nominated. Perhaps the most important function performed at such meetings is the submission and adoption of 'mandates' (*nakazy*), individual policy commitments which are proposed at the pre-election meeting, adopted or otherwise by simple majority in an open vote, and upon whose fulfilment the deputy must subsequently report back to his constituents. Soviet sources make it clear that officials from local soviets and social organizations take part in these meetings and 'assist the electors to evaluate correctly' the various proposals that have been made; this is supposedly to ensure that the mandates that are adopted are of social significance and are realistic in character.<sup>23</sup> Mandates, accordingly, are not an entirely unconstrained expression of popular preferences; but neither are they completely dissociated from popular sentiment, nor could they be if the whole exercise is to retain even a minimum of credibility in the eyes of the Soviet population, as the party evidently intends. An article on mandates was in fact the only new article to be included in the 1977 Soviet Constitution, following a nation-wide discussion over the preceding four months, and they were dealt with in more detail in a special decree of the Supreme Soviet Presidium of September 1980, whose preamble makes clear the importance that the leadership attaches to mandates as a means of providing for the expression of popular wishes and of strengthening the links between the soviets, their deputies and the population more generally.<sup>24</sup> More than 16,000 mandates were adopted by deputies to the previous Supreme Soviet, the 'majority' of which were reported to have been fulfilled.<sup>25</sup>

Pre-election meetings by convention involve a further demonstration of the relative standing of the members of the leadership, with less prominent members addressing their constituents much earlier than more senior members of the leadership, culminating in the General Secretary himself whose address to his electors normally takes place on the evening immediately before polling day. The first such meeting in 1984 was addressed by Yegor Ligachev, a Central Committee Secretary (and, as we have noted, Secretary of the Central Electoral Commission), whose pre-election meeting took place in the regional drama theatre in Tomsk on 9 February 1984.<sup>26</sup> Under normal circumstances the other members of the leadership would have followed in ascending order of importance, with Andropov speaking last of all on 3 March. The General Secretary, however, had been experiencing poor health for some time; he had last been seen in public the previous August, and on 9 February 1984 he died, his death being reported in the national press the following day. Konstantin Rusakov, another Central Committee Secretary, was meeting his constituents in Leninakhan, Armenia, on the same date (10 February); he began his speech by paying tribute to the memory of the dead leader,<sup>27</sup> and no further pre-election meetings took place for more than a week, by which time Konstantin Chernenko had been elected the new General Secretary. The other members of the leadership gave their addresses, from 18 February onwards, in ascending order of importance: first of all the other Central Committee Secretaries, then candidate members of the Politburo, and finally full members of the Politburo, concluding with Gromyko, Gorbachev, Tikhonov and then Chernenko himself over the four days immediately preceding the election.<sup>28</sup>

Andropov was not in fact the only validly nominated candidate who had died before the election could take place. On 19 February it was announced that Marshal Batinsky, former head of the Soviet anti-aircraft forces, had died, leaving a vacancy in the Bukhara constituency, Uzbekistan, in the Council of the Union; on 22 February it was announced that the veteran writer Mikhail Sholokhov, another long-serving deputy who had been nominated for the Rostov constituency, RSFSR, in the Council of Nationalities, had died at the age of 79; and on 24 February came the news that S. N. Imashev, chairman of the presidium of the Kazakh republic, had died, although he had been validly nominated for the Petropavlovsk constituency, North Kazakhstan, in the Council of the Union.<sup>29</sup> All the



corresponding vacancies were filled under the terms of the electoral law, which provides for the nomination of alternative candidates by the social organizations in the constituencies in such cases (art. 43). Andropov himself was replaced by Nina Motova, a grinder at the Moscow Ballbearing Works, and suitable replacements were found in the other constituencies as well. One candidate, however, who had been nominated for the Dzhambul district of Kazakhstan in the Council of Nationalities, died so shortly before the election that no alternative nomination could be made, and here (for the first time ever) no election took place on 4 March. The electoral law provides that vacancies arising in this manner shall be filled within the following month (art. 43); not until 10 June, however, did the necessary by-election take place, together with another by-election to replace a candidate who had died over the intervening period.<sup>30</sup>

Soviet elections always take place on a Sunday, which is a non-working day, and since 1979 they have by convention taken place in early March. Polling day itself is a time of meetings and demonstrations, of dance and celebration, and of the reporting of record-breaking feats in industry, agriculture and science. The 1984 election was no exception in this as in most other respects.<sup>31</sup> Voting begins at 6 a.m., according to the electoral law, and lasts until 10 p.m. local time (art. 51). In fact, the later hours are hardly necessary: according to the Central Electoral Commission in a report issued the following day, no fewer than 89.4 per cent of electors had cast their vote by 12 noon, and 99.6 per cent had done so by 6 p.m. (in 1979 one over-enthusiastic local paper went so far as to inform its readers that by midday some 80 per cent of electors in the constituency had already cast their votes for the single list of candidates, although formally no votes can be counted until the polling stations have closed).<sup>32</sup> As these figures might suggest, every effort is made to secure the maximum possible turnout.

Polling stations are set up, according to the electoral law, on Soviet ships at sea, in hospitals and sanatoriums, in long-distance trains and in large railway stations and river ports. All the votes so cast are added to those of the constituency within which the institution is located or in which the ship is registered.<sup>33</sup> A further five electoral precincts were set up on polar stations, one on the North Pole and four on the South Pole, all of which were attached to Leningrad constituencies.<sup>34</sup> Nor were Soviet voters in outer space forgotten. On 4 March a 'radiogram from cosmos' arrived at the Central Electoral Commission offices in Moscow, asking that the votes of the members of the Salyut 7/Soyuz 10/Progress 19 orbiting scientific complex be added to those of the Soviet people generally for the 'Leninist domestic and foreign policy of the Communist Party and the Soviet state, for the Central Committee of the CPSU [and] its Politburo headed by the General Secretary of the CC CPSU comrade Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko'.<sup>35</sup> No particular constituency was indicated, however, and the vote can hardly be regarded as a secret one as the electoral law requires (art. 5).

Soviet electoral procedures, on the face of it, are unexceptionable. Ballot papers must be filled out by the elector in person, making use if necessary of the screened-off booth that is provided. The presence of anyone other than the elector himself in the booth is not allowed, other than someone who has been specially nominated to assist the voter by deleting all names on the ballot paper other than that of the candidate for whom the elector wishes to vote. The paper is then dropped into the ballot box (art. 53). Procedures are also laid down for the conduct of business in the polling station, for the scrutiny of ballots and for the presence of representatives of social organizations and of the press, radio and television during the count (art. 54). The candidate who has received the votes of more than half of the electors within a constituency is declared elected, provided that at least half of the electors within the constituency have recorded their votes (art. 56). The ballot paper itself provides

ample space for the inclusion of a large number of candidates, together with details of the bodies by which they have been nominated.<sup>36</sup> In fact, however, there is invariably a single name upon the ballot paper, and a vote in favour is therefore recorded by dropping the paper, unmarked, into the ballot box; a vote against, as we have noted, requires the single name to be deleted, and this normally means that voters must draw attention to themselves by entering the screened-off booth at the side of the polling station. Recognizing the unsatisfactory character of present procedures, some Soviet constitutional lawyers have suggested that all electors, whatever their voting intentions, should be required to enter the booth, and that all should be required to mark the ballot paper in some positive fashion, even if they wish to record a vote in favour.<sup>37</sup> Up to the present, however, there has been no change in these well established but now somewhat formalistic procedures.

The outcome of the voting on 4 March 1984, perhaps not surprisingly, was an all but unanimous endorsement of the single-slate 'bloc of communists and non-party people'. The turnout, announced on 6 March by the Central Electoral Commission, was a massive 99.99 per cent; the vote in favour of the single list of candidates for the Council of the Union was scarcely less, at 99.94 per cent, and for the Council of Nationalities it was 99.95 per cent.<sup>38</sup> The level of turnout was the same as that recorded in 1979, which was the highest figure that had until then been recorded, but the percentage vote in favour of the single bloc of candidates increased slightly for both chambers, and is in both cases the highest that has ever been recorded in Soviet history (see Table 1). Soviet data, of course, are never to be taken entirely at face value, and although outright cases of falsification are nowadays uncommon (and severely sanctioned under the electoral law) the published figures overstate the 'real' turnout and favourable vote in at least one important respect. This is the use of 'absentee certificates' (*udostoverenie na pravo golosovaniya*), which electors may request if they are likely to be absent from their place of residence on polling day. The names of such people are duly deleted from the electoral roll and added to a supplementary list at the polling station to which they subsequently report on election day (art. 23 of the electoral law). In fact many electors are believed to use the 'absentee certificate' as a means of avoiding an unwelcome affirmation of support for the regime and have no intention of making use of their right to vote elsewhere.<sup>39</sup> Taking such factors into account, it has been estimated that the 'real' turnout in Soviet elections is more like 75–80 per cent, which is as it happens not very different from the turnout normally recorded in the major liberal democracies.<sup>40</sup>

There are also some doubts as to whether the electoral roll is entirely accurate. Just as, in some western countries, evidence has emerged which suggests that geographical mobility and other factors have made the electoral roll an increasingly imperfect guide to the population who might be eligible to be placed upon it,<sup>41</sup> so too in the Soviet case the number of those unrecorded in the electoral register appears to have been increasing considerably in recent years. The electoral law, as already noted, provides that all Soviet citizens who have attained the age of 18 shall have the vote, except the legally certified insane (art. 2); this means that stateless persons and citizens of other countries have no right to take part in elections, as they did until 1936, and in addition prisoners are by convention excluded from the franchise (there was a formal constitutional provision to this effect until 1958).<sup>42</sup> Beyond this again, citizens of the USSR who are entitled to vote but who for whatever reason are not included on local lists of residents are likely to be excluded; this will include all those who have not formally registered themselves as temporary residents of a given locality, normally because they have not received the legal right to reside there (for instance in one of the larger cities, where the demand to receive the right of residence always exceeds the number who are granted it). The evidence suggests that the number of those excluded from the franchise for such reasons remained relatively constant throughout the 1950s and early

1960s, at between 3 and 4 million or 2–3 per cent of the electorate, but it appears to have increased sharply in the later 1960s and early 1970s, reaching an estimated 9½ million in 1975, or 5.4 per cent of the electorate. Of this total, between 1 and 1½ million are believed to be inmates of mental homes and about 2 million are believed to be prisoners; the remaining 4 or 5 million are Soviet citizens who would be eligible to vote but who for whatever reason do not figure on the electoral register.<sup>43</sup> This would also suggest that the officially-reported figures for turnout and votes in favour may be exaggerated, or at least misleading.

The group of deputies elected by these procedures on 4 March 1984 is known as the 'Eleventh Convocation'. The composition of the USSR Supreme Soviet varies only very slightly from election to election, and the 1,499 deputies elected in March 1984 do not differ very greatly from their predecessors of earlier convocations (see Table 2). As before, a

TABLE 2. Deputies to the USSR Supreme Soviet, 1937–84

Convocation and date of election	CPSU members	Characteristics of deputies (percentages)			
		Workers	Collective farmers	Women	Under 30
First (1937)	76.1	41.4 <sup>a</sup>	28.4 <sup>a</sup>	16.5	24.9
Second (1946)	81.0	38.2	26.1	20.7	10.1
Third (1950)	83.5	31.8	20.4	21.3	6.5
Fourth (1954)	78.0	24.3	25.8	25.8	8.2
Fifth (1958)	76.1	23.2	21.4	26.6	7.7
Sixth (1962)	75.8	23.5	21.3	27.0	14.5
Seventh (1966)	75.2	26.6	19.4	28.0	12.0
Eighth (1970)	72.2	31.7	18.6	30.5	18.5
Ninth (1974)	72.2	32.8	17.9	31.3	18.4
Tenth (1979)	71.7	34.8	16.3	32.5	21.1
Eleventh (1984)	71.4	35.0	16.1	32.8	22.0

<sup>a</sup> Incomplete data

Sources: *Verkhovnyi Sovet SSSR devyatogo sozyva (statisticheskii sbornik)*, (Moscow, 1974), pp. 46–51; D. L. Zlatopol'sky, *Verkhovnyi Sovet SSSR: vyrazitel' voli sovetskogo naroda*, (Moscow, 1982), pp. 46–9; *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR*, no. 11, 14 March 1984, p. 203.

majority of deputies are either workers or collective farmers; these two groups accounted for 51.3 per cent of the total in 1984, as compared with 51.1 per cent in 1979 and 50.7 per cent in 1974. The proportion of party members continues to drop slowly, and the proportion of women continues to increase, as also does that of young people aged up to 30. The proportion of party members in the Supreme Soviet none the less remains much higher than the proportion of party members within the adult population as a whole, while the proportion of women and young people is by contrast rather less than their respective share of total population, as also is the share of workers and (particularly) of collective farmers. The reported proportion of workers and collective farmers tends also to include supervisory and other personnel who would not be regarded as 'genuine' workers or collective farmers by most western standards,<sup>44</sup> and they are also more likely than (for instance) party officials to be replaced at each subsequent election.<sup>45</sup> During his last months in power Andropov is believed to have proposed to the Politburo that the number of party and state officials in the Supreme Soviet be reduced, and that the proportion of workers, farmers, engineers and other specialists be increased; this did result in a slight decrease in the numbers of ministers and

regional party secretaries who were nominated to the new Supreme Soviet, but his political authority (and perhaps will) were insufficient to secure any more far reaching changes, and the deputies who were elected in March 1984 were in other respects very similar to their predecessors.<sup>46</sup>

### Conclusion: Non-competitive Elections and Soviet Politics

It would clearly be inappropriate to regard a Soviet election, or indeed an election in any communist-ruled country, as an exercise comparable in kind with those in the liberal democracies. These are indeed 'elections without choice', in which there is no possibility of the government being defeated, or even seriously challenged. Soviet elections, as compared with those of other communist countries, are in fact even more limited in the scope they provide for the expression of popular preferences through the medium of the ballot box. Among the European communist states, for instance, Hungary, Romania, Poland and (at the initial stages) Yugoslavia provide for some degree of choice of candidate at their elections, and several of these states permit more than one political party to function, although not to compete for power with the communist party itself.<sup>47</sup> The opportunities for electoral choice have, in fact, generally become greater through Eastern Europe since the 1960s; in Hungary, for instance, where multiple candidacies have been permitted since 1967, it was decided in 1983 that double or triple selections for seats in the National Assembly should be made compulsory in future years, and in Poland it was decided in early 1985 that double selections would be required for all seats in the Sejm elections which were due to take place later the same year.<sup>48</sup> In the USSR, however, apart from a tentative discussion of this possibility during the 1960s,<sup>49</sup> there has been no variation from the orthodox pattern first established in the late 1930s when the present system came into existence: no choice of candidate, no choice of party, and little real opportunity to reject or even challenge the single centrally-supported list of candidates. Some have even doubted if the term 'election' is an appropriate one to describe such exercises.<sup>50</sup>

Elections without choice, however, are not necessarily the same as elections without political significance. In the Soviet case at least, the electoral process appears to perform at least three important functions. The first of these is legitimation. Soviet political theory, as we noted at the outset, rests upon the notion of popular sovereignty, and socialist democracy is held to represent not a repudiation of democracy as such but rather the only genuine expression of that doctrine, embracing both its content as well as its procedural forms. The 1984 elections, as *Pravda* put it, served in this connection as new evidence of the unbreakable unity of the Communist Party and the people, and a new demonstration of the triumph of socialist democracy, which was a 'real, functioning democracy'. Casting their votes for the bloc of Communist and non-party candidates, the paper claimed, the Soviet people by their (all but) unanimous support had 'once again demonstrated their belief in the party's policy of communist creation and peace, their belief in the cause of Great October'.<sup>51</sup> The elections, according to Chernenko himself in his eve-of-poll address, were a 'report of Soviet power to the workers', a 'form of popular control over the work of those who have been entrusted with the direction of the socialist state'. The role of soviets at all levels of the system had become greater, Chernenko went on, but further improvements were required, particularly in informing citizens of the real state of public affairs and of the work of party and state bodies. The broadening and improvement of all state activities, he promised, would be a major element in the further development of Soviet society, and the party itself would be the 'motor, the driving force' of that development.<sup>52</sup>

Legitimation, of course, is not simply a matter of constitutional form and of assertion on

the party of political leaderships; more important, for most scholars, is the extent to which such claims in fact find support in public perceptions, allowing elections and representative institutions to play a significant role in the process by which a regime attempts to persuade the population over which it rules that its decisions should be accepted without at least overt and systematic coercion. Evidence on this subject in Soviet sources is unfortunately very limited and imperfect. An unpublished opinion poll conducted at the Likhachev auto works in Moscow in the early 1970s is reported to have found that 18 per cent of those polled were prepared to express outright dissatisfaction with the existing Soviet electoral system;<sup>53</sup> and interviews with recent Soviet *émigrés*, admittedly a problematic source, have found still lower levels of support for the electoral system, with responses 'ranging from scepticism to contempt'.<sup>54</sup> Some western investigations, however, have also found mixed evidence on this score,<sup>55</sup> and it would certainly be going too far to assume that elections were of no significance at all in conveying at least a limited impression of popular involvement in the choice of deputies and through them in the determination of public policy. The Soviet authorities themselves, at any rate, appear to take this view, devoting as they do a great deal of time and expense to elaborate election campaigns which take place, at all levels of government, for up to two months in three out of every four years; and it seems reasonable to assume that they themselves believe that elections play a part of some importance in attempting to ensure, as Brezhnev put it in his electoral address in 1979, that 'every, I repeat, every Soviet person should feel his involvement in state affairs, should be sure that his opinion, his voice will be listened to and taken account of in the making of major and minor decisions'.<sup>56</sup>

The significance of elections in terms of legitimation may be the greater because of the related role they play in terms of political communication between regime and citizenry. The role of mandates in this connection has already been considered. Additionally, there is a continuous process of interaction between individual voters and the canvassers who visit all households in the pre-election period, hearing complaints and grievances, and then attempting to ensure that all the individuals concerned exercise their democratic rights on polling day. According to the testimony of *émigrés* who have been involved in this process, canvassers report back upon the complaints and grievances they encounter, which are then passed on to the appropriate quarter. In exceptional cases electors may threaten not to vote unless a particular local grievance, such as a leaky roof in an apartment building, is attended to, a tactic which appears to produce results.<sup>57</sup> Comments may also be written upon the ballot paper, all of which are carefully examined after the election, sorted into categories, and then referred to the appropriate authorities (for instance the departments of a local soviet concerned with transport, the environment or housing).<sup>58</sup> The party Politburo, at its weekly meeting in early February, drew particular attention to the need for party and state officials to draw the appropriate conclusions from these communications and to ensure that they were dealt with, both by party and state and by other social organizations, with promptness and consideration.<sup>59</sup> The Supreme Soviet Presidium itself adopted a special decree on 2 April 1984, after the elections had taken place, calling upon republican and local soviets to take 'concrete measures' to implement the proposals and observations of citizens that had been expressed during the election campaign in pre-election meetings, letters and in other forms; the Presidium, and citizens themselves, were to be informed of the measures that had been taken.<sup>60</sup>

Thirdly and finally, Soviet elections provide a means of political mobilization and socialization which the authorities appear to find of value. Apart from the electoral turnout itself, which (as we have seen) involves nearly the whole of the adult population, a Soviet election engages many other sections of the population in a wide variety of centrally prescribed forms of political activity. The electoral commissions, for instance, involved more

than two million citizens in their activities during the 1984 election period.<sup>61</sup> Groups of agitators, political instructors and propagandists, of whom there were more than 9 million in the early 1980s, were given the task of providing series of lectures on electorally-related themes such as 'The Soviet state—a state of real democracy' and 'Elections in our country—a convincing proof of genuine people's power'.<sup>62</sup> A particularly important role, as always, devolved upon local party organizations throughout the country, which were given the task of supervising agitational, organizational and all other preparations for the election, and which normally play a leading part in the work of each local electoral commission.<sup>63</sup> Taking into account canvassers, unpaid activists attached to the electoral commissions and others associated with the campaign, one estimate is that at least 15 per cent of the adult citizenry typically participate to some degree in the organization of a Soviet election.<sup>64</sup> The number of deputies actually elected to the USSR Supreme Soviet is a fairly limited one, but the soviets at all levels embrace more than 2 million deputies and more than 30 million activists, and at national as well as local level there is a deliberate attempt to ensure that there is a reasonably high level of turnover from one election to the next in order that the soviets themselves can serve as 'schools of government' for the population generally (the 1961 Party Programme, still in force, suggested that at least a third of deputies should be replaced at each election in order to extend the experience of governing more widely).<sup>65</sup>

It is easy both to exaggerate and to minimize the importance of a Soviet election. They certainly represent no threat to the Soviet government or to the dominant position of the CPSU, which emerged from the 1984 elections as it had entered them, the longest-ruling single party anywhere in the world. The party, as in all previous Soviet elections, maintained a close grip upon proceedings at every stage, from the nomination of candidates to the counting of the ballot and the announcement of the result. If the essence of an election is some sort of choice, then this must be accounted no election at all or perhaps what a Polish source has termed a 'kind of referendum',<sup>66</sup> by which the population passes judgement in a highly constrained fashion upon the regime, deputies and policies in an undifferentiated whole. At the same time, simply by engaging in exercises of this kind, the Soviet authorities continue to demonstrate their attachment to the principles of popular sovereignty and socialist democracy, and continue to provide, perhaps to a greater extent than in earlier years, a mechanism for communication and interaction between the regime itself and the population over which it rules which may not be very different in kind from that of elections in other countries, particularly outside the liberal democracies. As the Soviet authorities confront the increasing economic difficulties of the later 1980s and beyond, it would be surprising if they did not attempt to make at least as much use of elections as they have done in the recent past as a means of explaining the policies they are trying to promote, obtaining 'feedback' from the population upon their operation and acceptability, and perhaps to some extent strengthening their ability to secure the implementation of those policies without resort to overly coercive means.

## References and Notes

1. The role of elections in communist systems generally is considered in Alex Pravda, 'Elections in communist party states', in: Guy Hermet *et al.*, *Elections without Choice*, (London: Macmillan, 1978), pp. 169–95. On the USSR more particularly see Peter Vanneman, *The Supreme Soviet: Politics and the Legislative Process in the Soviet Political System*, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1977) and Stephen White, 'The USSR Supreme Soviet: a developmental perspective', in: Daniel Nelson and Stephen White (editors), *Communist Legislatures in Comparative Perspective*, (London: Macmillan, 1982), pp. 125–59.
2. The text of the Soviet Constitution of 1977, and its predecessors, is conveniently available in Aryeh L. Unger, *Constitutional Development in the USSR*, (London: Methuen, 1981). Until



- 1936 those who exploited or lived off the labour of others, private traders and their agents, priests, members of the Tsarist family, and former policemen were excluded from the franchise: these amounted to an estimated 2–3 per cent of the total population at this time. See B. N. Ponomarev (editor), *Konstitutsiya SSSR. Politiko-pravovoi kommentarii*, (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1982), p. 267.
3. Text in *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR*, no. 28 (12 July 1978), art. 441: an English translation is available in W. E. Butler (editor), *Basic Documents on the Soviet Legal System*, (New York: Oceana Publications, 1983).
  4. L. A. Onikov and N. V. Shishlin (editors), *Kratkii politicheskii slovar'*, 2nd edn, (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1980), pp. 107–9, 145–6.
  5. This term is employed in Andrei Sakharov, *O strane i mire*, (New York: Khronika, 1976), p. 23, and in Hermet *et al.* (see note 1 above).
  6. Electoral Law, art. 53. The disincentive effect of procedures of this kind is attested to in, for instance, Vladimir Golyakhovsky, *Russian Doctor*, (New York: St. Martin's, 1984), p. 74.
  7. *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR*, no. 51 (21 December 1983), art. 785; *Pravda*, 18 December 1983, pp. 1–5, and 19 December 1983, pp. 1–4.
  8. Electoral Law, arts. 24–6 and 31.
  9. *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR*, no. 52 (28 December 1983), art. 803; *Pravda*, 21–4 December, normally at p. 1.
  10. *Pravda*, 17 December 1983, p. 1; *ibid.*, 20 December 1983, p. 1.
  11. See for instance Victor Zaslavsky and Robert J. Brym, 'The structure of power and the functions of Soviet local elections', in: Everett M. Jacobs (editor), *Soviet Local Politics and Government*, (London: Allen & Unwin, 1983), p. 76.
  12. See Ronald J. Hill, 'The CPSU in a Soviet local election campaign', *Soviet Studies*, 28:4, October 1976, pp. 590–8.
  13. *Pravda*, 20 December 1983, p. 1.
  14. See for instance 'Primernaya tematika lektsii, dokladov i besed v svyazi s vyborami v Verkhovnyi Sovet SSSR', *Politicheskoe samooobrazovanie*, no. 1 (1984), pp. 48–9; 'Zadachi agitatorov perez vyborami', *Agitator*, no. 1 (1984), pp. 6–8.
  15. See *Pravda*, 29 December 1983 to 12 January 1984, and 23 January 1984, p. 1 (nominations); and *ibid.*, 13 January to 28 January 1984 (meetings). Some instances of the rejection of nominations at the local level are reported in Theodore H. Friedgut, *Political Participation in the USSR*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 85–9.
  16. Alexander Rahr and Elizabeth Teague, 'Supreme Soviet nominations indicate Kremlin pecking order', *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin*, RL 72/84, 8 February 1984.
  17. *Pravda*, 28 January 1984, p. 1.
  18. See the *Guardian* (London), 3 February 1979, p. 5, and 6 February 1979, p. 4; also Roy A. Medvedev, *How I Ran for Election and How I Lost*, (Nottingham: Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, 1979).
  19. *Pravda*, 29 January to 8 February 1984, normally at p. 1.
  20. *Pravda*, 4 February 1984, p. 1.
  21. *Izvestiya*, 10 February 1984, pp. 1–2.
  22. *Pravda*, 7 February 1984, pp. 1–2.
  23. A. I. Luk'yanov *et al.*, *Sovety narodnykh deputatov: spravochnik*, (Moscow: Politizdat, 1984), p. 129.
  24. Unger, *Constitutional Development*, pp. 206–7; *Spravochnik partiinogo rabotnika*, vyp. 21, (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1981), pp. 434–7.
  25. *Sovety narodnykh deputatov*, no. 1 (1984), p. 15.
  26. *Pravda*, 10 February 1984, p. 2.
  27. *Pravda*, 11 February 1983, p. 3.
  28. *Pravda*, 19 February to 3 March 1984, normally at p. 1.
  29. *Pravda*, 19, 22 and 24 February 1984, all at p. 1.
  30. *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR*, no. 48 (28 November 1984), arts. 860–1.
  31. See *Pravda*, 4 March 1984, p. 1.
  32. *Pravda*, 5 March 1984, p. 1; M. A. Fedotov, 'Izбирatel'naya kampaniya i pressa', *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo*, no. 2 (1984), pp. 3–10, at p. 7.
  33. Electoral law, art. 16. In the 1984 elections 177 polling stations were set up at airports, 412 on passenger trains, 44 among tourist groups, and 135 at railway stations, (*Pravda*, 5 March 1984, p. 2).



34. *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR*, no. 4 (25 January 1984), art. 76.
35. *Pravda*, 5 March 1984, p. 1.
36. Specimens of the 1984 ballot papers were printed in *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR*, no. 1 (4 January 1984), pp. 62–4.
37. See Ronald J. Hill, *Soviet Politics, Political Science and Reform*, (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1980), pp. 31–2.
38. *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR*, no. 11 (14 March 1984), pp. 199–203.
39. Victor Zaslavsky and Robert J. Brym, 'The functions of elections in the USSR', *Soviet Studies*, 30:3, July 1978, pp. 362–71, at pp. 365–6 and 369–70; see also Konstantin Simis, 'On the eve of voting', *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin*, RL 70/79, 2 March 1979. A specimen of the certificate is printed in *Kommentarii Zakonu o vyborakh v Verkhovnyi Sovet SSSR*, (Moscow: Izvestiya, 1983), p. 106.
40. Zaslavsky and Brym, 'The functions of elections', p. 366.
41. See for instance Jean Todd and Bob Butcher, *Electoral Registration in 1981*, (London: Office of Population Censuses and Surveys, 1982).
42. Unger, *Constitutional Development*, p. 112.
43. See Sergei Voronitsyn, 'The unusual number of persons not included on the voters' rolls', *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin*, RL 67/77, 23 March 1977.
44. See Jerry F. Hough and Merle Fainsod, *How the Soviet Union is Governed*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979), pp. 365, 367.
45. See Ronald J. Hill, 'Continuity and Change in USSR Supreme Soviet Elections', *British Journal of Political Science*, 2:1, January 1972, pp. 47–67.
46. Zhores Medvedev, *Andropov: His Life and Death*, rev. edn, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984), pp. 220–3.
47. See Stephen White, John Gardner and George Schöpfung, *Communist Political Systems: An Introduction*, (London: Macmillan, 1982), p. 76.
48. *Radio Free Europe Background Report*, Hungary, 26 September 1983; *Financial Times*, 7 January 1985, p. 2.
49. Hill, *Soviet Politics*, pp. 24–30; Friedgut, *Political Participation*, pp. 145–7.
50. This is the thrust of Giovanni Sartori's celebrated article 'Concept misinformation in comparative politics', *American Political Science Review*, 63:4, December 1970, pp. 1033–53.
51. *Pravda*, 5 March 1984, p. 1.
52. K. U. Chernenko, *Narod i partiya ediny. Izbrannye rechi i stat'i*, (Moscow: Politizdat, 1984), pp. 9, 16–18.
53. Il'ya Zemtsov, *IKSI: the Moscow Institute of Applied Social Research*, (Jerusalem: Hebrew University, mimeo., 1976), p. 52.
54. Friedgut, *Political Participation*, p. 75.
55. See for instance Richard Rose and Harve Mossawir, 'Voting and elections: a functional analysis', *Political Studies*, 15:2, June 1967, pp. 173–201, particularly pp. 186, 191–2.
56. L. I. Brezhnev, *Leninskim kursom*, vol. 7, (Moscow: Politizdat, 1979), p. 616.
57. Zaslavsky and Brym, 'The functions of elections', p. 367.
58. See for instance Friedgut, *Political Participation*, pp. 112–13.
59. *Pravda*, 4 February 1984, p. 2.
60. *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR*, no. 15 (11 April 1984), art. 215.
61. *Pravda*, 4 February 1984, p. 2.
62. *Izvestiya*, 21 December 1984, p. 2; *Agitator*, 1984, no. 2, pp. 11–12.
63. *Pravda*, 20 December 1983, p. 1; Hill, 'The CPSU in a Soviet local election campaign', pp. 590–8.
64. Zaslavsky and Brym, 'The functions of elections', p. 365.
65. Friedgut, *Political Participation*, pp. 181–2.
66. *Tygodnik Powszechny*, 19 January 1957, cited in David E. Butler (editor), *Elections Abroad*, (London: Macmillan, 1959), p. 164.