Executive compensation and the cost of debt

Kabir, R., Li, H. and Veld-Merkoulova, Y. (2013) Executive compensation and the cost of debt. Journal of Banking and Finance, 37(8), pp. 2893-2907. (doi: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2013.04.020)

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Abstract

This study examines how different components of executive compensation affect the cost of debt. We find that debt-like and equity-like pay components have differing effects: an increase in defined benefit pensions is associated with lower bond yield spread, while higher share holdings lead to higher spreads. In addition, we find that stock options have a mixed impact on the cost of debt whereas cash bonus has no significant impact. Overall, our results indicate that corporate bondholders are fully aware of both risk-taking and risk-avoiding incentives created by various executive pay components.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Veld-Merkoulova, Professor Yulia
Authors: Kabir, R., Li, H., and Veld-Merkoulova, Y.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Accounting and Finance
Journal Name:Journal of Banking and Finance
Publisher:Elsevier Ltd.
ISSN:0378-4266
ISSN (Online):1872-6372
Published Online:29 April 2013

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