Brown, C. (2007) Two kinds of holism about values. Philosophical Quarterly, 57(228), pp. 456-463. (doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.490.x)
Full text not currently available from Enlighten.
Abstract
I compare two kinds of holism about values: G.E. Moore's ‘organic unities’, and Jonathan Dancy's ‘value holism’. I propose a simple formal model for representing evaluations of parts and wholes. I then define two conditions, additivism and invariabilism, which together imply a third, atomism. Since atomism is absurd, we must reject one of the former two conditions. This is where Moore and Dancy part company: whereas Moore rejects additivism, Dancy rejects invariabilism. I argue that Moore's view is more plausible. Invariabilism ought to be retained because (a) it eliminates the needless multiplication of values inherent in variable evaluations, and (b) it preserves a certain necessary connection between values and reasons, which Dancy himself endorses.
| Item Type: | Articles |
|---|---|
| Status: | Published |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Brown, Dr Campbell |
| Authors: | Brown, C. |
| Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BJ Ethics |
| College/School: | College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy |
| Journal Name: | Philosophical Quarterly |
| Publisher: | Blackwell Publishing |
| ISSN: | 0031-8094 |
| Published Online: | 07 March 2007 |
University Staff: Request a correction | Enlighten Editors: Update this record
Altmetric
Altmetric