Brown, C. (2011) Consequentialize this. Ethics, 121(4), pp. 749-771. (doi: 10.1086/660696)
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Abstract
To 'consequentialise' is to take a putatively non-consequentialist moral theory and show that it is actually just another form of consequentialism. Some have speculated that every moral theory can be consequentialised. If this were so, then consequentialism would be empty; it would have no substantive content. As I argue here, however, this is not so. Beginning with the core consequentialist commitment to 'maximising the good', I formulate a precise definition of consequentialism and demonstrate that, given this definition, several sorts of moral theory resist consequentialisation. My strategy is to decompose consequentialism into three conditions, which I call 'agent neutrality', 'no moral dilemmas', and 'dominance', and then to exhibit some moral theories which violate each of these.
| Item Type: | Articles |
|---|---|
| Status: | Published |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Brown, Dr Campbell |
| Authors: | Brown, C. |
| Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BJ Ethics |
| College/School: | College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy |
| Journal Name: | Ethics |
| Publisher: | University of Chicago Press |
| ISSN: | 0014-1704 |
| ISSN (Online): | 1539-297X |
| Copyright Holders: | Copyright © 2011 University of Chicago Press |
| First Published: | First published in Ethics 121(4):749-771 |
| Publisher Policy: | Reproduced in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher |
| Related URLs: |
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