Technology, unilateral commitments and cumulative emissions reduction

Chatterji, S. and Ghosal, S. (2009) Technology, unilateral commitments and cumulative emissions reduction. CESIFO Economic Studies, 55(2), pp. 286-305. (doi: 10.1093/cesifo/ifp009)

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In this article, we argue that weak property rights over transnational pollution and the limited threat of retaliatory punishments blunts the effectiveness of a broad-based multilateral agreement to deliver the emission reductions required to mitigate climate change. Instead, we propose a policy framework that builds on unilateral commitments, endogenous innovation and technology transfer that could lead to cumulative emissions reduction by altering the participation constraints of nations over time.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Ghosal, Professor Sayantan
Authors: Chatterji, S., and Ghosal, S.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
Journal Name:CESIFO Economic Studies
Published Online:06 April 2009

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