Ghosal, S. and Polemarchakis, H.M. (1997) Nash–Walras equilibria. Research in Economics, 51(1), pp. 31-40. (doi: 10.1006/reec.1996.0034)
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Abstract
At a Nash–Walras equilibrium, individuals exchange commodities competitively, and, simultaneously, they interact strategically. Under standard assumptions, Nash–Walras equilibria exist; equilibrium profiles of actions are, typically, determinate but pareto suboptimal, though not constrained pareto suboptimal: a transfer of revenue need not suffice for a pareto improvement in welfare.
| Item Type: | Articles |
|---|---|
| Status: | Published |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Ghosal, Professor Sayantan |
| Authors: | Ghosal, S., and Polemarchakis, H.M. |
| College/School: | College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics |
| Journal Name: | Research in Economics |
| ISSN: | 1090-9443 |
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