What makes pains unpleasant?

Bain, D.T. (2012) What makes pains unpleasant? Philosophical Studies, (doi: 10.1007/s11098-012-0049-7)

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The unpleasantness of pain motivates action. Hence many philosophers have doubted that it can be accounted for purely in terms of pain’s possession of indicative representational content. Instead, they have explained it in terms of subjects’ inclinations to stop their pains, or in terms of pain’s imperative content. I claim that such “noncognitivist” accounts fail to accommodate unpleasant pain’s reason-giving force. What is needed, I argue, is a view on which pains are unpleasant, motivate, and provide reasons in virtue of possessing content that is indeed indicative, but also, crucially, evaluative.

Item Type:Articles
Keywords:Pain, sensations, unpleasantness, philosophy of mind, reasons
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Bain, Dr David
Authors: Bain, D.T.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BD Speculative Philosophy
College/School:College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Philosophical Studies
Journal Abbr.:Phil. Studies
ISSN (Online):1573-0883
Published Online:04 December 2012

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Project CodeAward NoProject NamePrincipal InvestigatorFunder's NameFunder RefLead Dept
569651The Nature of Pain: Hedonic Tone, Motivation and Non-Human AnimalsMichael BradyThe John Templeton Foundation (JTF)UND Fund #26116HU - PHILOSOPHY