In defence of global egalitarianism

Knight, C. (2012) In defence of global egalitarianism. Journal of Global Ethics, 8(1), pp. 107-116. (doi: 10.1080/17449626.2011.635678)

69988.pdf - Accepted Version



This essay argues that David Miller's criticisms of global egalitarianism do not undermine the view where it is stated in one of its stronger, luck egalitarian forms. The claim that global egalitarianism cannot specify a metric of justice which is broad enough to exclude spurious claims for redistribution, but precise enough to appropriately value different kinds of advantage, implicitly assumes that cultural understandings are the only legitimate way of identifying what counts as advantage. But that is an assumption always or almost always rejected by global egalitarianism. The claim that global egalitarianism demands either too little redistribution, leaving the unborn and dissenters burdened with their societies' imprudent choices, or too much redistribution, creating perverse incentives by punishing prudent decisions, only presents a problem for global luck egalitarianism on the assumption that nations can legitimately inherit assets from earlier generations – again, an assumption very much at odds with global egalitarian assumptions.

Item Type:Articles
Additional Information:his is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor and Francis in Journal of Global Ethics on 16/04/12, available online:
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Knight, Dr Carl
Authors: Knight, C.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > School of Social and Political Sciences > Politics
Journal Name:Journal of Global Ethics
ISSN (Online):1744-9634
Published Online:16 March 2012
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2012 Taylor and Francis
First Published:First published in Journal of Global Ethics 8(1): 107-116
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher

University Staff: Request a correction | Enlighten Editors: Update this record