Political constitutionalism and the value of constitution making

Goldoni, M. (2014) Political constitutionalism and the value of constitution making. Ratio Juris, 27(3), pp. 387-408. (doi: 10.1111/raju.12050)

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The debate on political constitutionalism has entirely neglected the constitution-making dimension. This is probably due to the fact that constitution-making usually brings with it undesirable outcomes such as the entrenchment of rights or structures. These outcomes do not respect reasonable disagreement among citizens because they violate the only fair system for settling disagreement: majority rule and equal voting rights. This article argues that political constitutionalists may regret the absence of any claim about constitution-making. Either they are overlooking certain problems inherent to the electoral process that is supposed to tackle disagreement or, even worse, they are downplaying the entrenching effect of ordinary political processes by ignoring the redemptive properties of constituent power. In both cases, their claims undermine the political dimension of constitutionalism.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Goldoni, Professor Marco
Authors: Goldoni, M.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > School of Law
Journal Name:Ratio Juris
ISSN (Online):1467-9337
Published Online:11 August 2014

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