Knowledge, justification and normative coincidence

Smith, M. (2014) Knowledge, justification and normative coincidence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 89(2), pp. 273-295. (doi: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2012.00605.x)

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Publisher's URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2012.00605.x

Abstract

Say that two goals are normatively coincident just in case one cannot aim for one goal without automatically aiming for the other. While knowledge and justification are distinct epistemic goals, with distinct achievement conditions, this paper begins from the suggestion that they are nevertheless normatively coincident—aiming for knowledge and aiming for justification are one and the same activity. A number of surprising consequences follow from this—both specific consequences about how we can ascribe knowledge and justification in lottery cases and more general consequences about the nature of justification and the relationship between justification and evidential probability. Many of these consequences turn out to be at variance with conventional, prevailing views.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Smith, Dr Martin
Authors: Smith, M.
College/School:College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Publisher:Wiley
ISSN:0031-8205
ISSN (Online):1933-1592
Published Online:25 July 2012

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