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Rethinking the 'Orange Revolution'

STEPHEN WHITE AND IAN McALLISTER

A national representative survey in November–December 2007 suggests that there was little consensus about the nature of the 'Orange revolution', and that perceptions varied considerably by region and age-group. The main reason for participation was to 'protest against the authorities', but here too there were considerable regional differences. Eight focus groups conducted in different parts of the country allowed participants to articulate their distinctive interpretations of the events: an 'Orange' narrative that saw the events of late 2004 as an authentic popular uprising, and a 'Blue' narrative that saw them as a Western-funded coup. After the event, increasing numbers felt they had lost rather than gained, with the gains clearest in respect of freedom of speech and losses most marked in relations with Russia. Different views of the revolutionary events in turn were closely associated with voting choices in the September 2007 parliamentary election.

The 'Orange revolution' was not the only irregular executive change that took place in the former communist world in the early years of the new century, but it was arguably the most important. It meant a radical change of direction in a European country with a territory the size of France, a change of direction in a country with a population five times the size of Serbia's and ten times those of Georgia and Kyrgyzstan. And it meant a change of geopolitical significance, in that it took place in a country that was a former Soviet republic and a participant in the Commonwealth of Independent States, of a kind that seemed likely to carry it towards membership of the European Union and perhaps even the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It was not surprising that political leaders in Russia as well as the Western countries followed developments in Ukraine with close attention and occasionally intervened directly.

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The 'Orange revolution' was also the most complex of the political changes that took place after the end of communist rule. In particular, it took place in a country that was itself deeply divided by language and nationality (ethnicity), with political allegiances that closely reflected those divisions and regions that voted monolithically one way or the other. It was also one of the most protracted of the irregular executive changes that became known as coloured revolutions. It began at the end of October 2004, when the first round of the presidential election was held, and continued on 21 November, when the second round run-off appeared to have resulted in a victory for the Kremlin-friendly candidate Viktor Yanukovych. It was followed shortly afterwards by widespread and continuing demonstrations against the apparent falsification of the results, leading to a decision to repeat the second round ballot on 26 December. Then, in early January, his Western-oriented rival, Viktor Yushchenko, was declared the winner with 52 per cent of the vote, and (on 23 January 2005) was inaugurated as Ukraine's new president.

Not only was this the most significant and complex of the coloured revolutions, it has also been the most contested.[1] Even before the change of government had been completed there were accusations and counter-accusations about external intervention, and about the apparently spontaneous nature of the massive and mostly pro-Yushchenko demonstrations. Had an entire people stood up to reject an attempt to cheat them of the choice they had made at the ballot box – or had a Western-funded 'rent-a-crowd' simply rehearsed the tactics that appeared to have paid such rich dividends in Serbia and Georgia? What, in any case, was the nature of the changes that had taken place over 2004–5? Was it a 'revolution' – in other words, a far-reaching change in which the whole of the society had been engaged – or just another episode in the long-running struggle for power within the political elite that had followed the establishment of an independent politics at the end of 1991? How important was external involvement? And what were its consequences: did ordinary Ukrainians believe their society had changed as a result, and did it make any difference to their subsequent political behaviour?

We address such questions in this study on the basis of a body of evidence drawn from both the qualitative and the quantitative repertoires. We rely in the first place on a national survey conducted in November and early December 2007, not long after the parliamentary election had taken place, and representative of the country's voting-age population (further details are provided in the appendix). As well as questions about the 'Orange events' themselves, we asked questions that directly replicated those we had asked in earlier inquiries between 2000 and 2006, helping to capture the time dimension. And in addition to surveys, we commissioned a series of focus groups in the course of 2006 that allowed ordinary citizens in various parts of the country an opportunity to reflect on the changes they had experienced in their own words,

mediated through a local moderator.[2] We look first at patterns of engagement in the dramatic events of late 2004 and then consider the variety of assessments that emerged from our focus groups, which included participants from both sides as well as the much larger numbers that were simply spectators. We conclude with an examination of the longer-term implications of the Orange events – how they were evaluated in retrospect, and what they meant for party support at the elections that followed.

Being Orange

The 'Orange revolution' took place in a country whose political elite was deeply compromised. The economy, in fact, had been growing relatively quickly in the early years of the new century. Growth in real GDP averaged more than 8 per cent from 2000 to 2004; in 2004 alone it topped 12 per cent. There were matching increases in real incomes, which averaged more than 15 per cent over the same five years and reached more than 23 per cent in 2004; there were fewer who earned less than the subsistence minimum (although they were still about two-thirds of the entire population), and at the same time there was no obvious evidence that increasing incomes had been distributed more unequally, if the decile ratios were any guide. Unemployment had meanwhile been falling, from 11.6 per cent in 2000 to 8.6 per cent in 2004, and the value of retail trade had more than doubled over the same period.[3] The population as a whole was still contracting, by about half a million a year. All the same, there were relatively few indications of the kind of economic failure that might otherwise have been expected to predict the massive and continuing street protests that overturned the second round of the presidential election in November 2004 and then brought Viktor Yushchenko and his 'Orange' coalition to power.

It was, in fact, for other reasons that the Kuchma administration began to experience a deepening crisis of legitimacy of a kind that led directly to the dramatic events on the Maidan (Independence Square, in central Kyiv) and the decision to invalidate the original result of the second round of the presidential contest and hold a re-run in December. Perhaps the most important single element was the Gongadze case – the bizarre sequence of events that followed the disappearance of the independent journalist, Heorhiy Gongadze, in September 2000, and the discovery of his body two months later, headless and doused in acid in an apparent attempt to avoid identification. Shortly afterwards, an opposition politician released some tape recordings that had been covertly made in the presidential office between 1998 and 2000 and which appeared to implicate the president and a small group of leading associates in the measures that had been taken against Gongadze, although not necessarily in his murder. The tapes revealed not only this but also a series of

illegal actions including the sale of weapons abroad, the rigging of the presidential election that had brought Kuchma to power the previous year, and high-level corruption. The disclosure of the tapes and their compromising nature led directly to a series of public demonstrations and precipitated a 'deep political crisis that laid the foundation for the Orange Revolution four years later'.[4]

The Kuchma regime was certainly in trouble by early 2004, if the survey evidence was any guide. In the national survey we conducted in the spring of that year, just 4 per cent thought the state of the national economy was 'good' or 'very good'; 64 per cent thought it was 'bad' or 'very bad', and in the view of the majority it was getting worse, not better. There were particularly scathing judgements about the integrity of government itself.

Only 11 per cent thought there was 'great respect' or at least 'some respect' for the rights of individual citizens; 32 per cent thought there was 'not very much' and 54 per cent 'none at all'. There was overwhelming agreement that it was 'difficult' (23 per cent) or 'very difficult' (64 per cent) for ordinary people to exercise their rights; just 11 per cent took a more positive view. And there were savage judgements about the extent of official corruption. A majority thought 'almost all' public officials were corrupt (54 per cent; another 30 per cent thought 'most of them' were). And another majority thought corruption had 'increased significantly' since Soviet times (55 per cent); 20 per cent thought it had 'somewhat' increased, and only 3 per cent thought there was less of it.

On other evidence, judgements of this kind had been steadily darkening over the ten years of the Kuchma presidency and especially over the second presidential term, from 1999 onwards (see Figure 1). More than half of those who were asked in successive years thought they could express their opinions freely, but an increasing proportion took the opposite view (13 per cent in 2000, 23 per cent in 2003). Fewer thought there was a deputy who could represent their interests in parliament (24 per cent in 1998, but 40 per cent in 2004); increasing numbers thought the political situation was 'tense' (46 per cent in 2000, 55 per cent in 2004), and at least two-thirds thought they had no means at their disposal to resist government decisions with which they disagreed (66 per cent in 2000, 69 per cent in 2004). Judgements of the economy were increasingly positive, but trust in the presidency itself was falling rapidly as Kuchma's second term came to an end: just 2 per cent were prepared to give the presidency their 'entire trust' by 2004 (down from 7 per cent in 2000) and 30 per cent 'completely distrusted' it.

We invited respondents, three years after the dramatic events that had forced a change of national leadership at the end of 2004, to reflect first of all on the 'Orange revolution' itself. How much, in their view, had it been a spontaneous phenomenon, and how much had it been externally inspired, or

FIGURE 1
ASSESSING THE KUCHMA REGIME, 1995–2004 (PERCENTAGE POSITIVE BY YEAR)



Source: Adapted from N. Panina (ed.), *Ukrains'ke suspil'stvo 1992–2006: sotsiologichnii monitoring* [Ukrainian society 1992–2006: Sociological monitoring] (Kyiv: Institut sotsiologii NAN Ukraïni, 2006).
Notes: Question wordings were (economy) 'How do you assess the current economic situation in Ukraine?' (points 4 to 10 (high) on a 10-point scale); (presidency) 'To what extent do you trust the presidency?' ('somewhat' and 'entirely trust'); (parliament) 'To what extent do you trust the Verkhovna Rada? ('somewhat' and 'entirely trust').

even financed? For those who took the first view, they had been robbed of their victory: exit polls suggested the real winner of the run-off election in November had been Viktor Yushchenko, despite a massive campaign to frustrate the wishes of the electorate that had involved fleets of buses ferrying Yanukovych supporters from polling station to polling station and blatant abuses of other kinds. For those who took the second view a rather different process had been taking place, using the cover of youth movements trained by the activists who had led the way in Serbia and Georgia and who had been acting throughout at the behest of their American paymasters; from this perspective the events of late 2004 had been essentially a Western coup, its real objective to make use of a finely balanced election to bring another client government to power in what had formerly been a Soviet sphere of influence.

We set out our evidence in Table 1, which shows the pattern of popular responses in the immediate aftermath of the 'Orange revolution' as well as three years later (in the event, the two were very similar). Perhaps the clearest conclusion is the enduring lack of consensus on the nature of the changes that had taken place at the end of 2004 and early 2005. Somewhat more than

TABLE 1
WHAT WAS THE 'ORANGE REVOLUTION'?

	2005	2007
'A coup d'état carried out with the support of the West'	24	29
'A coup d'état prepared by the political opposition'	12	15
'A spontaneous popular protest'	12	18
'A conscious struggle of citizens united in a struggle to protect their rights'	33	27
Don't know/ No answer	19	11

Source: Authors' survey, November–December 2007, n = 1,200, in rounded percentages; see Appendix for further details. The 2005 figures are adapted from those in Viktor Stepanenko, 'How Ukrainians View Their Orange Revolution: Public Opinion and the National Peculiarities of Citizenry Political Activities', *Demokratizatsiya*, Vol.13, No.4 (2006), pp.595–616 (p.597) (fieldwork March–April 2005, n = 1,800).

a quarter saw them as a pro-Western conspiracy, a proportion that was slightly increasing; but almost the same proportion saw them as an authentic expression of popular discontentment. Similar but rather smaller numbers saw the 'revolution' as a coup by pro-Yushchenko oppositionists, or as an entirely spontaneous movement of ordinary citizens. And substantial, although diminishing, numbers found it difficult to make up their mind one way or the other. There was more agreement that the events of late 2004, whatever their nature, had been organized rather than spontaneous: a small proportion (15 per cent) thought they had been largely or entirely spontaneous, but 20 per cent thought they had been partly spontaneous and partly organized and a much more substantial 57 per cent thought they had been largely or entirely organized.

'National' responses of this kind are of limited significance in a society as deeply divided in its politics as contemporary Ukraine – above all between a strongly nationalist, pro-Yushchenko 'west' and a Russian-speaking 'east' that had voted just as overwhelmingly for Viktor Yanukovych and his Party of the Regions. And they are also of limited value in relation to a movement that was, or at least appeared to be, overwhelmingly composed of young people: of those who cheered the rock bands that appeared every night at the Maidan, who used the internet and mobile phones to bypass the official media, and who formed the 'PORA' (It's Time) network of activists on very similar lines to the youthful activists of 'Otpor' in Serbia and 'Kmara' in Georgia.[5] Each of these factors, in turn, had to be related to the others, and to a wider set of variables. Did region matter more or less than generation, for instance? Were students primarily students, wherever they lived, or were they more likely to share the same characteristics as the other people who lived in the same region? And did either region or generation make a statistically significant difference when income, education and other factors had been taken into account?

We examine some of these cross-cutting affiliations in Table 2. As we expected, there were substantial differences on all the attributes of subcultural identity. Across the entire sample, 83 per cent reported a 'Ukrainian' and 14 per cent a 'Russian' nationality. But 'Ukrainians' were more than twice as likely as their 'Russian' counterparts to see the political changes that had taken place at the end of 2004 as a 'deliberate struggle of citizens united in the struggle to defend their rights' (34 per cent, compared with 15 per cent). Conversely, 'Russians' were more likely to see them as a 'coup d'état carried out with the support of the West' (53 per cent took this view, compared with 28 per cent of 'Ukrainians'). There were similar and related differences in terms of language (across the entire sample, 37 per cent said they used Russian in their home environment and 62 per cent said they used Ukrainian). More than twice as many Ukrainian-speakers (48 per cent) as Russian-speakers (18 per cent), for instance, thought the political changes that had taken place at the end of 2004 had been a struggle of citizens for their individual rights; but more than twice as many Russian-speakers (46 per cent) as Ukrainian-speakers (19 per cent) saw them as a Western-supported coup d'état.

Nationality and language, in turn, are associated with place of residence. Within our sample, 91 per cent of those who lived in the 'west' defined

TABLE 2
VIEWS OF THE ORANGE REVOLUTION AND IDENTITY, LANGUAGE AND REGION

	Western coup	Opposition coup	Spontaneous	Deliberate struggle	Total	(N)
National identity						
Ukrainian	28	17	21	34	100	(891)
Russian	53	16	16	15	100	(147)
Language						
Ukrainian	19	12	26	43	100	(544)
Russian	45	22	15	18	100	(494)
Region						
Kyiv	13	2	19	66	100	(62)
North	14	22	27	37	100	(115)
Central	21	14	32	33	100	(130)
East	47	22	14	17	100	(361)
West	14	9	24	53	100	(235)
South	57	18	15	10	100	(162)

Source: as Table 1.
Notes: Question wordings were: 'What is your nationality?'; 'In what language do you usually communicate at home?'; and macro-region, defined as follows: Kyiv city; North: Kyiv, Chernihiv, Zhytomyr and Sumy regions; Centre: Cherkasy, Poltava, Vinnytsia and Kirovohrad regions; East: Zaporizhia, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk and Luhansk regions; West: Volyn, Zakarpattia, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Rivne, Ternopil, Khmelnytskyi and Chernivtsi regions; and South: the autonomous republic of Crimea including the city of Sevastopol, Odessa, Mykolyaiv and Kherson regions.

themselves as Ukrainian by nationality, and exactly the same proportion as Ukrainian speaking; of those who lived in the 'east', 73 per cent and 23 per cent respectively did so, and of those who lived in the 'south' (including the rather special case of the Crimea, which had been a part of the Russian Federation until 1954), 74 per cent and 27 per cent respectively did so. Once again, those who lived in the 'west' were much more likely than those living in the east or south to see the revolutionary events of the last months of 2004 as a conscious struggle of citizens in defence of their individual rights; conversely, the 'east' and above all the 'south' were more likely to see it as a Western-supported coup. None the less, the patterns were not entirely consistent. In particular, the most support of all for the view that the 'Orange revolution' had been a deliberate struggle of citizens in defence of their rights was in the capital city, where 66 per cent held this view, compared with 31 per cent across the country as a whole. Clearly, macro-regions are ethnically and linguistically heterogeneous, and responses were determined by other factors as well as those that related to identity and residence.

Residence was obviously a critical determinant of the ability of our various respondents to take part in a sequence of events that was mostly being played out in the capital city. Across the entire sample, those who had taken part in the revolutionary events in Kyiv or another town or village, or who had made some material contribution to the insurgents, were a small minority (Table 3), and there was relatively little variation in responses between our own survey and those of earlier years. But once again, nationality, language and residence all made a difference. Across the entire sample, for instance, 12 per cent had taken a direct part in the events themselves; among 'Ukrainians' 13 per cent had done so, and among Ukrainian-speakers 15 per cent. Among 'Russians' and Russian speakers the proportions were much lower, at 3 and 8 per cent respectively. Not surprisingly, those who took part were a much higher proportion of the population of the capital city (36 per cent) than was the case

TABLE 3
WHO PROTESTED DURING THE 'ORANGE REVOLUTION'?

	2005	2007
Took part in protest actions in Kyiv	5	4
Took part in another town or village	13	8
Did not participate directly but helped those who participated with food, money or similar	5	3
Did not take part in the protest action	79	82
Hard to say/ No answer	0	4

Source: As Table 1.
Notes: In 2005 respondents were allowed to select more than one option and the total accordingly exceeds 100 per cent.

in other regions; they were also more numerous among those who had made a material contribution of some other kind, at 11 per cent. This meant that almost half (47 per cent) of the city's entire population of more than 2.5 million had been engaged to some degree in the revolutionary events that had been unfolding on the Maidan.

Which of these various factors made the most difference? We set out a multivariate analysis in Table 4, seeking to predict participation or otherwise by reference to age, gender, education, nationality, language, self-assessed income and region. Given that our dependent variable is dichotomous (participation or not), our method is logistic regression. In general, it was regional effects that were the most important when other factors had been held constant, even after cultural identity and other predictors had been taken into account. As we had expected, those who lived in the south, the east and the centre were substantially less likely to have taken part in the events of late 2004 than those who lived in other regions; at the other extreme, northerners were the least likely of all to have done so (Kyiv was the excluded category). This suggests that where people lived was a factor in its own right and not

TABLE 4
SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS, REGION AND PARTICIPATION IN THE ORANGE REVOLUTION

	Est	Std error
Age (years)	−.028**	.006
Gender (male)	.258	.187
Tertiary education	.502*	.207
Cultural identity		
Russian speaker	−.158	.272
Russian identity	−.918*	.454
Family income		
High family income	.203	.255
Low family income	−.345	.318
Region (excluding Kyiv)		
North	−.701	.373
Centre	−1.980**	.418
East	−2.844**	.385
West	−.756*	.351
South	−3.242**	.549
Constant	.888	
Nagelkerke R-sq	.292	
(N)	(1,157)	

Source: As Table 1.
Notes: ** significant at p.01, * $p < .05$. Logistic regression results showing parameter estimates and standard errors predicting participation in the Orange revolution (coded 1 = participated in or assisted, 0 = did not participate in or assist). The independent variables are all coded 0 or 1 except for age, which is in years. High family income is the top quintile, low family income the bottom quintile. For region, the excluded category is Kyiv.

simply an artefact of the cultural identity or social background of the people living there.

Of the other factors, it was age that emerged as the most important: all other things being equal, the younger a respondent, the more likely they would have taken some part in the revolutionary events of late 2004. Education also made a difference (a higher education was associated with participation when other variables were held constant), although it was about only a quarter as important as age. Next in importance was Russian nationality, which reduced participation significantly when other factors had been held constant. Perhaps surprisingly, language was of no importance once region and identity had been taken into account, nor was self-assessed family income, suggesting that the revolutionary events of the end of the year owed relatively little to apparent differences in levels of material prosperity. In short, participation in the 'Orange revolution' was principally to do with where the person lived, and with their age, and with relatively little else; in these respects it was closer to the protest movements in Western countries of recent years that have been concerned with issues such as the environment or human rights, and less like the protest movements of earlier years that were based on distinct social groups such as students or farmers.[6]

Whether or not they were participants, what did our respondents themselves think had inspired this unprecedented wave of activism? Consistently, across the years, it was seen first of all as a form of 'protest against the authorities', followed by a movement that had been inspired by the hope that it would bring about an improvement in living standards (Table 5). But as we had hypothesized, there were considerable variations by age and region of residence. For example, 'protesting against the authorities' as a reason for engaging in the street action that had taken place at the end of the year was more likely to be mentioned by those living in the centre (59 per cent) than in the south (28 per cent). Similarly, the 'arousing of Ukrainian national consciousness' was more likely to be mentioned by respondents living in the west (31 per cent) than in the east (12 per cent). Age was also likely to make a difference. Younger respondents, in particular, were more inclined to explain the revolutionary events in terms of Ukrainian national consciousness; older respondents were more likely to mention practical issues, such as 'an improvement in living conditions'.

Experiencing Orange

The same divisions ran through our eight focus groups, conducted in various parts of the country between August and October 2006, although there were also some common elements (further details are provided in the appendix). There were certainly some elements of this kind in the responses of our

TABLE 5
THE CAUSES OF THE 'ORANGE REVOLUTION'

	2005	2007
Protest against the authorities	42	36
Hope for improvement in material conditions	30	31
Aversion to one of the presidential candidates	25	24
Emotional protest against injustice	20	24
An opportunity to earn money	n.d.	24
Arousing of Ukrainian national consciousness	19	20
Concern for one's children's future	22	15
Desire to participate in a colourful show	10	12
A choice between 'good' and 'evil'	13	7
A choice of geopolitical orientation between Russia and the West	5	5
Other	2	n.d.
Hard to say/ No answer	16	9

Source: As Table 1.
Notes: n.d.=No Data. The question wording was: 'What in your opinion were the main reasons for the political activism of citizens during the "Orange revolution"?' (up to three responses allowed; card provided).

participants in L'viv, in the Ukrainian-speaking west, where there was firm support for the 'Orange revolution' itself but considerable disappointment with the way in which it had been exploited by ambitious politicians. For Bogdan, a 60-year-old factory worker, the changes that had taken place had been nothing less than the equivalent of the French revolution of 1789, which had also matured over a long period as people became progressively fed up with the 'corruption and humiliation' they had been forced to endure, and which had similarly been very spontaneous in its early stages although there had been some 'assistance' from abroad. Many of her friends, explained Ol'ga, a 30-year-old who worked in the regional administration, had taken part: nobody had pressured them to do so, and nobody had paid them any money. It was more like Brazil, where everyone took part in the carnival; people just needed a 'euphoria of friendship and revolution'. But then others had become involved, because it 'gave the clans a chance to settle old scores, share out the winnings, and sort things out the way they wanted'.

Less than two years after Maidan, there was already considerable disillusionment. People had lost their energy and ambition, Ol'ga went on, and now the 'mentality of the Slavic peoples' had reasserted itself; they were just 'sitting and waiting' until there were further developments. Some had always been sceptical, like Yekaterina, a telephone operator in her early thirties, who had 'not supported the revolution from the very outset'; the whole thing had been a 'waste of time and money'. Alexandra, a lawyer in her early twenties, took the same view: they had just 'been offered big

money', and then the 'crowd instinct' came into play – 'everyone was taking part'. After three days it was clear the whole thing was pointless. And what difference had it made? Aleksei, a student in his early twenties, had been sure there would be changes, and specifically an increase in his grant; but the grant had stayed the same, and so had everything else. For some, at least, there had been 'minor improvements' (Orisya, a manager in her mid-twenties); the traffic police, for instance, were less likely to take bribes. And for others, there was now an 'element of freedom' in personal relations (Oleg, a university lecturer in his mid-twenties). But Yekaterina, who as a service worker had regular dealings with ordinary people, saw no changes at all: people had just 'become embittered', as they had been hoping for 'positive developments' and nothing of the kind had taken place.

There were more positive views in Rivne, an industrial centre in the strongly nationalist north-west. Ukrainians, explained Aleksandra, a medical office worker in her early forties, were certainly very patient; but the Orange revolution had shown that 'people could all the same stand up', and that their patience was 'not unlimited'; they wanted to change things for the better, and perhaps in the end they would be able to do so. Yelena, an accountant in her mid-twenties, was also optimistic: there had, after all, been new elections, because of public pressure. Igor' Vladimirovich, an engineer in his late forties, recalled that the Italian and Polish film crews that had been covering their activities were 'in a state of shock': they had not expected anything of the kind in Ukraine, where ordinary people were supposed to be a passive 'herd of cattle'. There had been a complete change of consciousness among young people, even if there had been some disenchantment; now they knew that if they acted together they could achieve whatever they wanted. In fact, everyone had become more politically aware, added Yelena; 'not only older people, but younger ones as well – everyone [had] seen the result'. All of them had become more conscious citizens, taking an interest in government policies in a way they had never done before.

Other participants took a similar view. Igor' Iosifovich, a part-time driver in his mid-forties, thought the most important result of the Orange revolution was that 'people had begun to respect themselves', in public life particularly.

Ol'ga, another accountant in her mid-forties, was even more enthusiastic: 'the Orange revolution, our revolution, gave our people a great deal. First of all, that we could think of ourselves as Ukrainians'. Already there had been real differences – for instance, they could see the television programme 'Freedom of Speech' after its host, Savik Shuster, had been obliged to leave Moscow (a comment that was made by participants elsewhere). Speaking personally, the Orange revolution had been the 'happiest days of [her] life'. Nina, a pensioner in her late fifties, called it the 'event of the century'. Had it achieved anything? 'Certainly it did. The right to speak, to think, to feel'.

Yes, Ol'ga accepted, there had been organizers; there had to be, just to ensure the crowds were kept under control. But there was 'no doubt that people [had] taken part because they wanted to do so, without any question'. Had it been a revolution or not? For Igor' Iosifovich, there had been no 'fundamental break', as in the French revolution; the form of government was still the same. But for Ol'ga, the aim had never been this kind of far-reaching change – the establishment of a monarchy, for instance; it had simply been the conduct of honest elections.

There were very different views in the Russian-speaking and Yanukovych-voting east and south. In the mining city of Donetsk, where a statue of Lenin still dominates the central square, the entire Orange phenomenon had simply been a 'well rehearsed spectacle' put on by 'skilful technologists' who had exploited the dissatisfaction that already existed for a variety of other reasons (Nikolai, a senior factory worker in his late thirties). Ordinary Ukrainians – 'the people, not the nation' – were 'absolutely not prepared for such a revolution'; people had just 'managed to stir them up' with a variety of monetary and other inducements. For Sergei, a salesman who was also in his late thirties, the whole thing had been 'carried out with American money', first of all in Serbia, then in Georgia, and now in Ukraine. Konstantin, a student in his early twenties, had a more precise diagnosis: 'the Soros Foundation', because 'everywhere it appears, there is – what can you call them – a "democratic revolution"'; it was just another example of this 'well-rehearsed political technology'. On the part of the Orange supporters, at least, it had 'all been planned, prepared and practised' (Viktoriya, an economist in her late twenties).

There were some, even in the east, who were all the same prepared to see the political changes of the end of 2004 as a 'genuinely popular uprising' (Pëtr, a pensioner in his early sixties); people had demonstrated because they had expected 'some kind of change' as a result of the presidential election, and when they were 'cruelly deceived, they came out on the street'. For Yelena, a nurse in her early thirties, perhaps 80 per cent had 'really been motivated by ideas' for the first five days or so; but when it became known that some of them were being paid for their services, others began to have the same idea. Easterners, of course, had also demonstrated in support of their candidate Viktor Yanukovych, and there was general agreement that they had been motivated first of all by considerations of a more principled kind: to 'support their candidate' (Irina, a housewife in her mid-thirties), to 'defend their vote' (Viktoriya), or to defend the Russian language and the Donbas region (Nikolai). Some of them, it was accepted, had been paid; but how otherwise were they to feed themselves outside their home town?

What, in any case, had really changed? You could certainly talk more freely, but 'it was no easier to feed yourself', remarked Nikolai. This, it emerged, was a very general response. In principle, Konstantin explained,

> we received freedom of speech, more or less. The media became a bit more democratic, people began to express their views more openly, the journalists themselves [became more honest]. But at the same time we got a huge crisis in the economy, and we got problems in foreign policy, where we started to change our orientation completely.

Sergei was still more dissatisfied: 'Prices have gone up, relations with Russia have suffered badly, industry is in decline'. Others pointed out that people were still buying mobile phones (Pëtr), and although it was supposed to be 'impossible to live' (Yelena), everyone she knew was repairing their apartment and there were 'endless queues in the shops'. She herself had changed her household detergent since the elections: it used to be a local product and her sheets were always grey, now she used *Tide* or *Ariel* and could afford to do so as her salary had doubled. But others still pointed out that with prices rising rapidly, it was obviously a good idea to buy things of lasting value like furniture or consumer durables while they were still affordable (Viktoriya and Sof'ya, a transport supervisor in her late fifties). Generally, it was this mixed view that prevailed: things were 'neither better, nor worse' (Nikolai), or, as others put it, the balance was about '50:50' (Konstantin, Irina).

In the city of Poltava, in east-central Ukraine, participants were also very cynical about the motivation of the Orange insurgents. For Tanya, a teacher in her mid-forties, they had just been 'carrying out the instructions of their superiors', in a kind of 'puppet theatre'. For Stanislav, a pensioner in his early sixties, it had been a youth movement to begin with, made up of young people who genuinely wanted a better life; but professional politicians had quickly taken over and it was at this point that financial reward and the particular grievances of western Ukraine had become the dominant consideration. Daniil, a 20-year-old student, took the same view: people were 'just fed up with Kuchmism' in the first instance, and only later had it become something out of which they could make money. It was 'no secret' that those who spent their time at the Maidan had earned a hundred *grivna* a day (about $18.50), with subsistence on top. But for Yelena, a university teacher in her mid-forties, the motivation was evenly balanced: some had made money out of their participation, others had brought their own food and medicines to the demonstrators and taken part in the singing, 'quite disinterestedly'. Some kind of organization had obviously been necessary, with its own forms of communication, under the control of 'professionals'. But it 'wouldn't have been possible if that wasn't what people wanted'; it was a unique moment in which 'everything [had] coincided'.

Quite apart from the motivation, what kind of a movement had it been? Tanya's own daughter had been at the Maidan: she had been in Kyiv for

other reasons, and went along to have a look. As she told her mother, the whole thing had been a 'month-long festival'; there was always someone who wanted to dance, and entertain, and give you something to eat. But afterwards you went away and wondered: was this just a celebration, or had there been some kind of struggle of ideas going on? Tanya herself had been hostile to the demonstrations from the outset. How many young people, for instance, had been hospitalized because of the bitter cold! It was other people's children who had been called on to the streets, while the leaders spent their own time in well-heated apartments. Tamara (another teacher in her mid-forties) was one of many who refused to call it a 'revolution', which would have meant a fundamental change in the 'system of government'. What was this but (in the words of another participant) a kind of 'nationwide get-together [*tusovka*]'? Her own daughter had been there as well, delighted with the opportunity to hear a succession of the country's best rock bands; everyone was having fun, and being paid for it as well. But when she came home, it was a very different story: what, she asked her mother, would happen now?

In Khar'kiv, Ukraine's second-largest city and its former capital, there were still more hostile judgements. It had been an 'American' revolution, insisted Ol'ga, in her mid-twenties and out of work, not an Orange or a popular one. It was no kind of 'popular revolution', agreed Andrei, from a private firm and also in his mid-twenties, even if many of those who took part had been inspired by their ideals and only a few had made money out of it; there was nothing popular about it, it was 'just a means of gaining power'. Further south, in the shipbuilding city of Mykolaiv, the same views were well represented. For Zhanna, a librarian in her mid-forties, it had been a movement of 'high-ups', with many of those who had taken part being paid to go to Kyiv and stand on the Maidan. Many of them had 'earned quite a bit', enough to cover the rent on their apartment for the next three years; 'just a few' had more idealistic objectives. For Arkadii, a writer in his early forties, it had 'not even been concealed that it [had been] one of the revolutions in a worldwide destructive process that [had been] financed by American intelligence' – in other words, the overthrow of rulers in less powerful states with no particular inspiration other than a 'vague abstract justice'. In the end, it was just the 'ousting of one group from power and its replacement by another', conducted, others suggested, in the form of theatre, with some actors paid for their services and others taking part just for the hell of it (Yevgenii, a student in his early twenties).

There was general agreement, across the east and south as well as the west, that the outcome of the revolutionary events had been disappointing, or even negative. In Poltava, 'absolutely nothing' had changed, except that people were no longer prepared to take this kind of action as they could see it led nowhere (Oleg, a driver in his mid-thirties). For Stanislav, a pensioner in

his mid-sixties, the most obvious result of the transfer of presidential power had been the appointment of 'incompetent people' throughout the regions, whose only qualification was that they were enthusiastic Yushchenko supporters. Those who were leaving, agreed Tat'yana (a teacher in her mid-forties), had 'years of experience' and a 'real understanding' of the local economy; they had been replaced overnight by people who had 'absolutely no knowledge of the area [or] of the job they were supposed to be doing'. The result was that people had lost their hope that things would ever improve; all that had actually happened was a struggle for political power that was still continuing.

Meanwhile, the economic situation was going from bad to worse. Nothing at all had changed, thought Svetlana, a telephone-operator in our Mykolaiv group who was in her early forties, except that prices had gone up. For Alena, an 18-year-old student, the only result was that relations with Russia had become more difficult, and (once again) that prices had increased. Firms were collapsing, added Alexander, an engineer in his mid-fifties, and attempts were being made to impose the Ukrainian language in schools and colleges. Russia, in fact, had a rich literature, while Ukraine had none of its own, and yet Russian textbooks were being discarded when there were no Ukrainian ones that could adequately replace them (Yevgenii). Others saw a more disturbing development, which was a 'national confrontation' between the two rather different communities that lived on opposite sides of the Dnieper (Arkadii). But a more widely shared view was that nothing had changed except the people in power (Arkadii and Nadezhda, a teacher in her early thirties). In the Black Sea port of Kherson there were similar complaints about 'higher prices for bread, for gas, for everything else' (Igor', a driver in his late forties); about 'salaries, if you can call them that', and unemployment benefits that had 'stayed where they were' (Sasha, a taxi-driver in his early fifties); and that there was nowhere for young people to work, as the local economy had not recovered (Tamara, a pensioner in her early sixties).

Kyiv, the capital, was where the most dramatic confrontations had taken place, and it reflected opinion throughout the country in two key respects: at least initially, in the view of our participants, it had been a genuinely popular movement, but at the same time it had led to disappointingly little change outside the mass media (Table 6 sets out some of the most common responses across this and the other groups, organized in competing 'narratives'). In Kyiv, as elsewhere, there were cynics: like Vladimir, a department store head in his mid-thirties, who thought ordinary people were 'just like wheels on a car'; everything depended on who the driver was (in this case, big money). But Marina, a 20-year-old student, had a rather different view. She had made her way to the Maidan because she felt she had to do so, and 'to be honest, got a lot of satisfaction out of it', even inspiration. Nobody

TABLE 6
A TYPOLOGY OF FOCUS GROUP RESPONSES

	An 'Orange' narrative	*A 'Blue' narrative*
Immediate origins	Spontaneous, especially in the early stages	Fomented: 'political technologists' exploited existing grievances, demonstrators paid money
	The 'crowd instinct'	
Causes?	Against 'corruption and humiliation'	An 'American' (externally financed) revolution, latest in an orchestrated sequence
	Rejection of 'Kuchmism'	
A 'revolution'?	A successor to the French revolution	No 'fundamental break', just an elite coup
	A 'genuinely popular uprising'	A 'month-long holiday'
The consequences?	New elections	'None'
	More 'freedom' in the media and in inter-personal relations	Appointment of new but incompetent local officials
	Empowerment: a feeling that 'people could all the same stand up', and that if they acted together, they could change things	Higher prices
		A more difficult relationship with Russia
		Closure of Russian-language schools and TV channels
	National pride	Disillusionment

had put any pressure on her, although there obviously had to be someone who could organize the crowd and make sure there were no disorders. For Bogdan, another student in his mid-twenties, the organizers certainly had money, but all the same it had been a genuine people's revolution; 'not everyone was there for the money'. Svetlana, a librarian in her late forties, was also sure there had been a popular revolution, and had 'herself experienced a kind of feeling she had never experienced before, and which she couldn't explain'.

There was something of the same elusive, mystical quality in the kinds of changes that were reported. Tanya, an economist in her late thirties, thought there was 'freedom in the air' – that people had 'somehow begun to think more freely', after 15 years in which they had said nothing at all. But as there were no genuinely independent media, a greater degree of media freedom meant a greater freedom to express the views of the business interests that owned them; it was just that people themselves felt they could more readily express their own opinions (Sergei, an economist in his mid-forties). And 'economically nothing had changed, except for the worse'; prices had shot up, and increases in pay and pensions had quickly been overtaken. Indeed there were setbacks even in the media: for instance, the two main Russian television channels had disappeared from cable television (Vladimir). But all the same, revolutions of every kind had at least one very important consequence: 'people change psychologically' (Vladimir Ignatovich, a security guard in his late fifties). It was just 'absurd' to expect improvements in

circumstances of this kind: revolutions always involved a heavy cost to the economy, and even famine. 'But God gave us a revolution without this kind of destruction.' Now people felt that if they acted together, they could change something; this was the 'biggest change of all'.

After Orange

What, then, were the consequences of the 'Orange' changes – and how were they distributed by age, gender, region and nationality? Other evidence has certainly suggested that the euphoria of the start of 2005 had quickly been dissipated by the continuing inability to form a stable administration that would take forward its reformist agenda (by August 2006 Yanukovych himself had returned as a prime minister with newly enhanced powers). At the time of Yushchenko's election nearly half of the society (48 per cent) were 'revolutionary enthusiasts', who strongly supported the revolutionary movement and expected positive changes; about a quarter were 'revolutionary opponents' (23 per cent), who strongly opposed the revolutionary movement and did not expect positive changes, and 29 per cent were 'revolutionary agnostics', who gave qualified support to the revolution but were less sure it would have a positive outcome. By the end of the year the 'revolutionary enthusiasts' had broken into two groups – 29 per cent were still 'committed enthusiasts', but a new group of 'dissatisfied supporters' (24 per cent) had appeared who felt let down by what had happened since the December 2004 elections (there was relatively little change in the numbers of 'committed opponents' – 25 per cent – and 'agnostics' – 22 per cent).[7]

There was a corresponding change in the numbers who thought they had 'gained' or 'lost' as a result of the revolutionary changes. Initially, there had been far more 'winners' than 'losers' (see Table 7). But by 2006, opinion had more or less reversed itself, and by 2007, when our own survey was fielded, there were even more who thought they had lost, although somewhat larger numbers thought the changes that had taken place since the end of 2004 had been broadly neutral; the same was true a year later. Not surprisingly, those who had themselves taken part in the revolutionary events were more likely to think of themselves as 'winners', more likely to see them as a 'conscious struggle of citizens' rather than a 'Western coup', and more likely to say they would take part again if they had another opportunity to do so. Across the entire sample, for instance, 12 per cent had taken part in the revolutionary events in Kyiv or elsewhere, but they were 39 per cent of those who thought they were 'winners'; 27 per cent thought the revolutionary events had been a 'conscious struggle', but 57 per cent of those who had taken part themselves; and 13 per cent of the entire sample said they would

TABLE 7
WINNERS OR LOSERS IN THE 'ORANGE REVOLUTION'

	2005	2006	2007	2008
'Lost'	12	35	39	37
'Neither gained nor lost'	56	49	46	51
'Gained'	32	16	14	12

Source: For 2007 as Table 1; other figures adapted from V. Voroni and M. Shul'gi (eds.), *Ukrains'ke suspil'stvo 1992–2008: sotsiologichnii monitoring* (Kyiv: Institut sotsiologii NAN Ukraïni, 2008), p.271.
Notes: Don't knows and non-responses have been excluded in all cases.

'definitely' or 'probably' take part in another movement of this kind, compared with 38 per cent of those who had taken part themselves in the Orange events.

Whether they had gained or lost personally, there were very different assessments of the kinds of changes that had followed the Orange events (Figure 2). There was more trust in the media in 2008 than there had been before the end of 2004, but even more were distrustful, and their numbers had been steadily increasing. There was no more trust in the police than there had been before the Orange events (14 per cent in 2008, 14 per cent in 2004), and much larger numbers continued to distrust them (56 per cent in 2008, 58 per cent in 2004 and 57 per cent ten years earlier). There was a slight increase in trust in the political parties, but from a very low point: no more than 10 per cent were prepared to trust them even partially by 2008, and no other institution had less public respect. Perhaps the clearest effect was the rapid increase in confidence in the president (now Viktor Yushchenko) and the Ukrainian parliament, but in both cases there was an equally rapid decline. In 2005 the newly elected president had the confidence of 49 per cent; by 2008 he had retained the confidence of less than half this number (23 per cent) and was distrusted by twice as many (50 per cent). The Ukrainian parliament, similarly, experienced a rapid increase in confidence levels in 2005, but three years later it was trusted by no more than 12 per cent and distrusted by almost five times as many (59 per cent).

On our own evidence, it was civil and political rights that had improved most strikingly, and social and economic circumstances that had deteriorated most significantly – apart from relations with Russia, which were seen as the biggest loss of all (see Figure 3). It was the 'opportunity to express your personal views freely' that had improved the most, followed by 'relations with the USA' and the 'opportunity to obtain reliable information about what is taking place in the country'. But social and economic conditions in the country as a whole had sharply worsened; so had conditions in respondents'

FIGURE 2
TRUST IN INSTITUTIONS, 1995–2008 (PERCENTAGE POSITIVE BY YEAR)



Source: As Table 7.

FIGURE 3
GAINS OR LOSSES IN THE 'ORANGE REVOLUTION', 2007



Source: As Table 1. Figures show the percentage who reported an improvement in each respect minus the percentage who reported the opposite.

own families. Relations between Russians and Ukrainians, and opportunities for Russian-speakers to make use of their own language, had grown worse as well. Perhaps most surprisingly, individual rights were also thought to be less secure than they had been before a popular movement that had overturned a falsified election and the individuals who had been responsible for it. Nearly a third of our respondents thought they were less well protected against arbitrary behaviour by the authorities than before the Orange events (just 7 per cent saw an improvement), and even more substantial numbers thought official corruption had become either 'somewhat' (24 per cent) or 'significantly' worse (19 per cent); once again, just 7 per cent saw an improvement.

We examine these responses more closely in Table 8, which uses factor analysis to identify any patterns that might underlie these various attitudes.

TABLE 8
WHAT CHANGED AFTER THE ORANGE REVOLUTION? (FACTOR ANALYSIS)

	Factor loadings		
Improved since Orange Revolution	I	II	II
Economy			
Conditions of ordinary people	*80*	32	06
Family economy	*80*	27	03
Economy in Ukraine	*73*	37	05
Russia			
Relations with Russia	16	*79*	−09
Opportunity to speak Russian	23	*68*	16
Ethnic relations in Ukraine	15	*65*	24
Protection from authorities	31	*54*	17
Rights			
Relations with US	−06	16	*80*
Relations with EU	−03	28	*76*
Free speech	45	−06	*67*
Right to have reliable information	57	−02	*57*
Eigenvalue	4.11	1.64	1.13
Percent variance explained	37.4	14.9	10.3

Source: As Table 1.
Notes: Principal components factor analysis using varimax rotation. The questions were: 'How would you evaluate the changes in your own and the country's life that have taken place since the "Orange revolution" of 2004? (i) Your own and your family's living conditions; (ii) living conditions in the region or population centre in which you live; (iii) the economic situation in Ukraine as a whole; (iv) the opportunity to receive reliable information about what is taking place in the country; (v) the opportunity to express one's personal views freely; (vi) inter-ethnic relations in Ukraine itself; (vii) the opportunities for Russian-speaking residents of Ukraine to make free use of Russian in various spheres of life: (viii) protection from arbitrary action by government or officials; (ix) Ukraine's relations with Russia; (x) Ukraine's relations with the countries of Europe (the European Union); (xi) Ukraine's relations with the USA; (xii) corruption in state bodies. Have they significantly worsened, somewhat worsened, stayed the same, somewhat improved, significantly improved, too soon to say/no answer?' (card).

The analysis reveals three main concerns about what changed following the Orange revolution, based on the 12 items included in the table. The first and most important is associated with the economy, reflected in the conditions of the population, the family's own economic situation and that of the country as a whole; these three items load strongly together and display only weak associations with the other two. The second factor identifies Russia as a concern, with three items reflecting general relations with Russia, including the language, and a fourth item associated with government authority, which was obviously interpreted by the respondents as being linked to Russia. The third concern is associated with rights and freedoms, and is measured by relations with the US and the EU, freedom of speech, and the ability to gain access to reliable information. In general, respondents were most optimistic about rights, with a mean of 5.6 on a ten-point scale, and most pessimistic about the effect of the Orange revolution on relations with Russia, broadly defined, with a mean of 3.8. Not surprisingly, those who participated in the Orange revolution themselves were the most optimistic about the improvement of individual rights, with an average response that was fully one point higher than the population as a whole.

Finally, we turn to the direct effects of 'Orange' on party support in the September 2007 parliamentary election (our survey took place shortly afterwards).[8] Across the entire sample, those who had participated in the Orange events were more likely than others to have voted in the first place – although levels of turnout were very high in all categories (nearly 88 per cent reported voting in the second-round presidential contest, but 93 per cent of those who had taken a direct part in the revolutionary events). Predictably, those who had participated directly were also more numerous among those who had given their preference to the parties that claimed the Orange legacy – the Tymoshenko Bloc and President Yushchenko's 'Our Ukraine' – than among the still more substantial numbers, strongly concentrated in the south and east, who had voted for Yanukovych's Party of the Regions. Across the entire sample, for instance, 12 per cent said they had taken part in the Orange events, in the capital or elsewhere – but they were 19 per cent of those who had voted for Yushchenko's party and 26 per cent of those who had voted for the Tymoshenko Bloc compared with just 1 per cent of those who had voted for the Party of the Regions. The associations were even closer at the regional level – more Yushchenko voters in the west had taken part in the Orange events, for instance, than among Yushchenko voters in the country as a whole.

There were similar differences in the view that our various respondents took of the Orange movement itself. Across the entire sample, for instance, 27 per cent thought it had been a 'conscious struggle of citizens for their rights', and 29 per cent that it had been a 'Western coup'; but 49 per cent

of Tymoshenko voters and 58 per cent of Yushchenko voters thought it had been a 'conscious struggle' (only 4 per cent of Party of the Regions voters took the same view), while 55 per cent of Party of the Regions voters saw it as a 'Western coup' but only 8 and 10 per cent of Tymoshenko and Yushchenko voters respectively. Similarly, 12 per cent thought they had 'gained' from the revolutionary events that had taken place at the end of 2004, but they were twice as numerous among those who had voted for the Tymoshenko Bloc (26 per cent) and Our Ukraine (27 per cent), and very much fewer among those who said they had voted for the Party of the Regions (a mere 2 per cent). All these relationships were mutually reinforcing: participants, for instance, were more likely to think of the revolutionary events as 'a conscious struggle of citizens for their rights'; those who thought of the revolutionary events in this way were more likely to vote for the Tymoshenko Bloc or Yushchenko's 'Our Ukraine'; and those who voted for either of the Orange parties were themselves more likely to have participated in the revolutionary events and to think of them as a 'conscious struggle'.

Which of these were the variables that made a difference? We isolate their individual effects in Table 9, which shows that participation in the Orange revolution was clearly a factor differentiating the two most widely supported

TABLE 9
PARTY SUPPORT IN 2007 AND THE ORANGE REVOLUTION (LOGISTIC REGRESSION ESTIMATES)

	Party of Regions		Tymoshenko Bloc		Our Ukraine	
	Est	SE	Est	SE	Est	SE
Participation in Orange Rev						
Participated	−2.176**	.522	1.049**	.262	−.393	.290
Would participate again	−.833**	.140	.235**	.094	.329**	.102
Consequences						
Personally a winner	−1.396**	.228	.465**	.167	.727**	.190
More influence on decisions	−.480	.267	.131	.199	−.186	.225
Revolution good for…						
Economy	−.028	.077	.091	.068	−.101	.077
Russia	−.342**	.112	.247**	.093	.188	.104
Rights	.130	.111	−.084	.082	.134	.091
Constant	6.817		−3.583		−4.386	
Nagelkerke R-squared	.640		.307		.161	
(N)	(957)		(957)		(957)	

Source: As Table 1.
Notes: ** statistically significant at $p < .01$, * $p < .05$. Logistic regression results showing parameter estimates and standard errors predicting vote in the 2007 election, among votes only. Participation and consequences are coded as in Tables 3 and 8, and gains or losses are scored as 0 to 10 scales.

parties, the Party of Regions and the Tymoshenko Bloc. The results show that voters for the Party of the Regions were significantly less likely to have been engaged in the protest, everything else held constant. Most important for these voters, however, was the sense that they had lost as a result of the Orange events, and that relations with Russia had been damaged; they were less influenced by the effect the revolutionary events appeared to have had on the economy or on individual rights. By contrast, having been a protester was by far the most important individual predictor of a vote for the Tymoshenko Bloc. Unlike their competitors in the Party of the Regions, Tymoshenko voters thought they had generally gained from the protest, and were inclined to believe that relations with Russia had actually improved as a result. Voters for the third group, 'Our Ukraine', were no more likely to have been protesters, but they were more likely to see themselves as beneficiaries. Clearly, participation in the Orange revolution was an act that differentiated the supporters of the two main parties; and even when direct participation was less important, as in the case of 'Our Ukraine' voters, a retrospective assessment of the revolutionary events was still a very powerful determinant.

Some Conclusions

Perhaps the clearest summary conclusion is the enduring salience of regional divisions – reflected in the way in which the 'Orange revolution' was regarded, in the extent to which the wider society took part in its development, and in the way in which they assessed it in retrospect. Yushchenko's eventual victory, it has to be remembered, was not an overwhelming one; there was more than 90 per cent support in four of the western regions, but 90 per cent for his opponent in two of the regions in the Russian-speaking east, and more than 80 per cent in the Crimea. The research literature has repeatedly demonstrated that in Ukraine, region makes a difference – even when socio-economic and other variables have been taken into account.[9] Indeed, it makes a difference not just to the way in which the 'Orange revolution' is assessed but to other attitudes as well, including views about the European Union and NATO.[10] Regions, obviously, are not homogeneous – the survey evidence makes this clear, and so do the variety of opinions within our various focus groups; Kyiv stood out as an exception in many respects, not surprisingly as it was the focus of the protest movement. But the fundamental cleavage still remained.

A second conclusion is that the outcome of the 'Orange revolution' has not been uniform – at least, in the view of those who live in the society itself. In some respects, changes have been in the predicted direction – there is more media freedom, for instance; trust in the media has continued to increase; many of our focus group participants spoke of the 'freedom' that had

entered into their personal relations. The effect on Ukraine's relations with the outside world, at least as Ukrainians themselves perceive it, has also been in the expected direction: better relations with the USA and European Union member countries, worse relations with Russia. But there is general agreement that living standards have been damaged by the Orange events, particularly in the country as a whole. Russian speakers thought they had lost ground in their ability to use their native language. And perhaps surprisingly, there was general agreement that individual rights were less securely protected than they had been before the events of late 2004, and that government corruption had become worse, not better. As our factor analysis showed, these were not randomly-distributed responses; rather, they were definable groups of responses, tied together for particular groups of respondents by their attitudes towards the economy, towards Russia and the Russian language, and towards individual rights and freedoms.

A third conclusion is that the effects of the 'Orange revolution' have often been transient – to such an extent it is reasonable to query the term 'revolution', and more appropriate to use a term like 'evolution'.[11] As we saw, there were dramatic changes in the extent to which ordinary Ukrainians were prepared to trust the presidency, and their elected parliament. But that confidence disappeared almost as quickly and was still declining at the end of 2008,[12] leaving little net difference over the whole post-independence period. In other respects there was little change even in 2005 – trust in the media and in the political parties, for instance, continued to increase very slowly. The same conclusion emerges from other evidence – the surveys commissioned by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems in November 2005 found that fewer Ukrainians thought that their country was a democracy, or that they could influence national decision-making, or that voting gave ordinary people influence over decision-making, than had been the case at the beginning of the year; by October 2008, 79 per cent did not believe that voting gave 'people like them' an influence on decision-making (this was twice as many as had taken this pessimistic view in February 2005), and 85 per cent did not believe that 'people like them' could influence government decisions.[13]

A particular focus of this study has been the retrospective evaluation of the Orange events by those who participated directly, or at least by those who witnessed them as members of the wider society. It is clear that there have been substantial changes – at least to some extent, towards those who view the events in retrospect as a 'Western coup' rather than a 'conscious struggle of citizens', but more obviously, towards the view that ordinary Ukrainians were more likely to have lost rather than gained as a result of the dramatic changes that took place at the end of the 2004. This was obviously associated with the view that our respondents took of the outcome of the revolutionary

changes. Those who thought they had lost were more likely than others to believe their economic situation had worsened; they were less likely than others to say they would take part again if a similar opportunity presented itself; and they were disproportionately well represented among those who voted for the Party of the Regions in the September 2007 parliamentary election – the most strongly supported of all the parties in 2006 as well as 2007, with about a third of the vote on both occasions.

It is likely, in turn, that differences in citizens' retrospective perception of the 'Orange revolution' will continue to play a major part in Ukrainian politics. As we saw in the focus groups, two rather different narratives have become established: a 'liberal revolution', most strongly associated with Ukrainian speakers in the north and west, and a 'Western coup' interpretation that is most strongly associated with Russian speakers in the east and south, and very similar to the official discourse of the Russian leadership and those who share its assumptions.[14] But even among those who are committed to the 'liberal' narrative the events of the last months of 2004 remain divisive: if hopes have been disappointed, who squandered them? Among the Orange leaders, who betrayed the legacy of those dramatic events and who was true to them – why, for instance, as Tymoshenko put it, had she 'stood at all the Orange maidans' for a person who had 'fallen to such a level' over the years that followed that it was 'shameful even to mention his name'?[15] Long after the events of 2004, the changes that took place and that failed to take place have acquired a life of their own, reinforcing the divisions of which they were originally an expression.

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NOTES

1. For the wider context of the Ukrainian events of the end of 2004 see for instance Andrew Wilson, *Ukraine's Orange Revolution* (New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 2005); Anders Åslund and Michael McFaul (eds.), *Revolution in Orange: The Origins of Ukraine's Democratic Breakthrough* (Washington, DC: Carnegie, 2006); Taras Kuzio (ed.), 'Democratic Revolution in Ukraine: From Kuchmagate to Orange Revolution', special issue of the *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, Vol.23, No.1 (2007); and most recently David Lane, 'The Orange Revolution: "People's Revolution" or Revolutionary Coup?', *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, Vol.10, No.4 (2008), pp.525–49.
2. Focus groups have been little used so far in the study of post-communist politics, although they have a number of obvious advantages in societies in which there is still a strong cultural

bias towards reporting opinions that are thought to be favoured by those who are asking the questions, or in general the state authorities. As Richard A. Krueger has noted, focus groups 'allow the researcher to get in touch with participants' perceptions, attitudes, and opinions in a way that other procedures do not allow': *Focus Groups: A Practical Guide for Applied Research*, 2nd edn (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1994), p.238. There is a substantial methodological literature: see, for instance, Rosaline Barbour, *Doing Focus Groups* (London: Sage, 2007), and Monique M. Hennink, *International Focus Group Research: A Handbook for the Health and Social Sciences* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), which pays particular attention to the additional issues that arise in a cross-national context. In addition to the sources cited elsewhere in this essay, the state of public opinion in Ukraine immediately following the 'Orange' events is set out in Richard Rose, *Divisions within Ukraine: A Post-Election Opinion Survey*, SPP 403 (Glasgow: Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde, 2005).

3. See <http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua>, accessed 15 Feb. 2009.
4. Taras Kuzio, 'Oligarchs, Tapes and Oranges: "Kuchmagate" to the Orange Revolution', *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, Vol.23, No.1 (2007), pp.30–56 (p.42).
5. On music in particular, see Bohdan Klid, 'Rock, Pop and Politics in Ukraine's 2004 Presidential Campaign and Orange Revolution', *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, Vol.23, No.1 (2007), pp.118–37; on the internet see, for instance, Olga Filippova, 'Anti-Orange Discourses in Ukraine's Internet: Before the Orange Split', ibid., pp.138–51.
6. See for instance Russell J. Dalton, *Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies*, 5th edn (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2008), pp.66–9.
7. *Public Opinion in Ukraine, November 2005. Findings from Survey and Focus Group Research* (Washington, DC: IFES, 2005), p.13.
8. For the background to these elections, see Nathaniel Copsey, 'The Ukrainian Parliamentary Elections of 2007', *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, Vol.24, No.2 (2008), pp.297–309. Earlier elections are considered in Vicki L. Hesli, 'The Orange Revolution: 2004 Presidential Election(s) in Ukraine', *Electoral Studies*, Vol.25, No.1 (2006), pp.168–77, and Vicki L. Hesli, 'The 2006 Parliamentary Election in Ukraine', *Electoral Studies*, Vol.26, No.2 (2007), pp.507–11.
9. See, for instance, Sarah Birch, 'Interpreting the Regional Effect in Ukrainian Politics', *Europe–Asia Studies*, Vol.52, No.6 (2000), pp.1017–41; Lowell Barrington and Erik Herron, 'One Ukraine or Many? Regionalism in Ukraine and its Political Consequences', *Nationalities Papers*, Vol.32, No.1 (2004), pp.53–86; Stephen Shulman, 'The Contours of Civic and Ethnic National Identification in Ukraine', *Europe–Asia Studies*, Vol.56, No.1 (2004), pp.35–56; and Ivan Katchnovski, 'Regional Political Dimensions in Ukraine in 1991–2006', *Nationalities Papers*, Vol.34, No.5 (2006), pp.507–32.
10. Neil Munro, 'Which Way Does Ukraine Face? Popular Orientations Toward Russia and Western Europe', *Problems of Post-Communism*, Vol.54, No.6 (2007), pp.43–58.
11. Ivan Katchanovski, 'The Orange Evolution? The "Orange Revolution" and Political Changes in Ukraine', *Post-Soviet Affairs*, Vol.24, No.4 (2008), pp.351–82.
12. Just 12 per cent, for instance, had confidence in President Yushchenko by October 2008: see <http://www.ifes.org/files/UkrainePresentation.pdf>, accessed 27 Feb. 2009.
13. *Public Opinion in Ukraine 2008* (IFES, November 2008), available at <http://www.ifes.org/files/UkrainePresentation.pdf>, accessed 27 Feb. 2009.
14. See Jeanne Wilson, 'Coloured Revolutions: The View from Moscow and Beijing' *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, Vol.25, Nos.2–3 (2009), pp.369–95.
15. 'I v khvost i v grivnu' [Both tail and hrivna], 22 Dec.2008, available at <http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2008/12/22_a_2915484.shtml>, accessed 14 Feb. 2009. The title is a play on words in Russian: *griva* means 'mane'; Russian g equates to Ukrainian h.

Appendix

Our focus groups were conducted between August and October 2006 under the auspices of Dr Vladimir Korobov of the Kherson National Technical University, who acted as moderator, on the basis of a set of open-ended questions supplied by the authors. The focus groups had typically eight but sometimes nine or ten participants, balanced by gender, drawn from the working-age population (the youngest was 18 and the oldest 63, but for the most part participants were in their thirties, forties or fifties and in current employment). In addition to a complete transcript, we received a videotaped record of the proceedings and a commentary by the moderator. In all, there were eight focus groups: one in Kyiv; two in the 'South', Kherson and Mykolyaiv/Nikolaev; two in the 'West', L'viv/L'vov and Rivne/Rovno (in both cases the discussion was in Ukrainian); and three in the 'East', Donetsk, Kharkiv/Khar'kov and Poltava.

Our 2004 survey was conducted under the auspices of Russian Research between 23 March and 2 April (n = 2000); there were 259 sampling points, and 187 interviewers were employed. The original data may be consulted through the UK Data Archive, study no. SN 5671. We conducted a survey in 2006 under the same auspices between 24 April and 12 May (n = 1600); there were 131 primary sampling units, and 55 interviewers. Our 2007 survey was conducted by the Kyiv-based agency Socis between 17 November and 3 December (n = 1200); there were 86 primary sampling units, and 102 interviewers were employed.