An ultra-realist theory of perception

Weir, A.J. (2004) An ultra-realist theory of perception. International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 12(2), pp. 105-128. (doi: 10.1080/09672550410001679819)

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In this paper I argue for a theory of perception distinct both from classical sense-datum theories and from intentionalist theories, that is theories according to which one perceives external objects by dint of a relation with a propositional content. The alternative I propose completely rejects any representational element in perception. When one sees that an object has a property, the situation or state of affairs of its having that property is one's perception, so that the object and property are literally part of one's mind. The most obvious objection to this view is that it embodies a rampant form of idealism. It is argued to the contrary, via consideration of the metaphysics of situations, that the theory is entirely consistent with a robustly realist view of the world.

Item Type:Articles
Keywords:perception, realism, representation, externalism, memory, illusion
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Weir, Professor Alan
Authors: Weir, A.J.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology
B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BD Speculative Philosophy
College/School:College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:International Journal of Philosophical Studies
ISSN (Online):1466-4542

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