The liar, the strengthened liar, and bivalence

Rieger, A. (2001) The liar, the strengthened liar, and bivalence. Erkenntnis, 54(2), pp. 195-203. (doi:10.1023/A:1005600831298)

Full text not currently available from Enlighten.

Publisher's URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1005600831298

Abstract

A view often expressed is that to classify the liar sentence as neither true nor false is satisfactory for the simple liar but not for the strengthened liar. I argue that in fact it is equally unsatisfactory for both liars. I go on to discuss whether, nevertheless, Kripke's theory of truth represents an advance on that of Tarski.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Rieger, Dr Adam
Authors: Rieger, A.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BC Logic
College/School:College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Erkenntnis
ISSN:0165-0106
ISSN (Online):1572-8420

University Staff: Request a correction | Enlighten Editors: Update this record