Bain, D.T. (2007) Color, externalism and switch cases. Southern Journal of Philosophy, 45(3), pp. 335-362. (doi: 10.1111/j.2041-6962.2007.tb00055.x)
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Abstract
I defend externalism about color experiences and color thoughts, which I argue color objectivism requires. Externalists face the following question: would a subject's wearing inverting lenses eventually change the color content of, for instance, those visual experiences the subject reports with “red”? From the work of Ned Block, David Velleman, Paul Boghossian, Michael Tye, and Fiona Macpherson, I extract problems facing those who answer “Yes” and problems facing those who answer “No.” I show how these problems can be overcome, leaving externalism available to the color objectivist.
Item Type: | Articles |
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Status: | Published |
Refereed: | Yes |
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Bain, Dr David |
Authors: | Bain, D.T. |
Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) |
College/School: | College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy |
Journal Name: | Southern Journal of Philosophy |
ISSN: | 0038-4283 |
Published Online: | 02 March 2010 |
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