Color, externalism and switch cases

Bain, D.T. (2007) Color, externalism and switch cases. Southern Journal of Philosophy, 45(3), pp. 335-362. (doi: 10.1111/j.2041-6962.2007.tb00055.x)

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I defend externalism about color experiences and color thoughts, which I argue color objectivism requires. Externalists face the following question: would a subject's wearing inverting lenses eventually change the color content of, for instance, those visual experiences the subject reports with “red”? From the work of Ned Block, David Velleman, Paul Boghossian, Michael Tye, and Fiona Macpherson, I extract problems facing those who answer “Yes” and problems facing those who answer “No.” I show how these problems can be overcome, leaving externalism available to the color objectivist.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Bain, Dr David
Authors: Bain, D.T.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
College/School:College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Southern Journal of Philosophy
Published Online:02 March 2010

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