Lombardi, M. (2008) Uncovered set choice rules. Social Choice and Welfare, 31(2), pp. 271-279. (doi: 10.1007/s00355-007-0281-9)
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Abstract
I study necessary and sufficient conditions for a choice function to be rationalized in the following sense: there exists a total asymmetric relation T (a tournament) such that, for each feasible (finite) set, the choice set coincides with the uncovered set of T restricted to that feasible set. This notion of ‘maximization’ offers testable restrictions on observable choice behavior.
| Item Type: | Articles |
|---|---|
| Status: | Published |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Lombardi, Dr Michele |
| Authors: | Lombardi, M. |
| College/School: | College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics |
| Journal Name: | Social Choice and Welfare |
| ISSN: | 0176-1714 |
| Published Online: | 12 October 2007 |
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