Bayesian consistent belief selection

Chambers, C.P. and Hayashi, T. (2010) Bayesian consistent belief selection. Journal of Economic Theory, 145(1), pp. 432-439. (doi: 10.1016/j.jet.2009.07.001)

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A subjective expected utility agent is given information about the state of the world in the form of a set of possible priors. She is assumed to form her beliefs given this information. A set of priors may be updated according to Bayes' rule, prior-by-prior, upon learning that some state of the world has not obtained. In a model in which information is completely summarized by this set of priors, we show that there exists no decision maker who obeys Bayes' rule, conditions her prior only on the available information (by selecting a belief in the announced set), and who updates the information prior-by-prior using Bayes' rule.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Hayashi, Professor Takashi
Authors: Chambers, C.P., and Hayashi, T.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
Journal Name:Journal of Economic Theory
Published Online:29 July 2009

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