Nash implementation of competitive equilibria in the job-matching market

Hayashi, T. and Sakai, T. (2009) Nash implementation of competitive equilibria in the job-matching market. International Journal of Game Theory, 38(4), pp. 453-467. (doi: 10.1007/s00182-009-0163-8)

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This paper studies Nash implementation in the job-matching market where each worker works for only one firm and a firm hires as many workers as it wishes. We show that the competitive equilibrium correspondence (CEC) is the smallest Nash implementable correspondence satisfying individual rationality and Pareto indifference. Furthermore, the CEC is the minimal monotonic extension of the worker-optimal and firm-optimal subcorrespondences. We offer two “good” mechanisms that implement this correspondence in Nash equilibrium.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Hayashi, Professor Takashi
Authors: Hayashi, T., and Sakai, T.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
Journal Name:International Journal of Game Theory
Published Online:30 June 2009

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