Preference aggregation under uncertainty: Savage vs. Pareto

Chambers, C.P. and Hayashi, T. (2006) Preference aggregation under uncertainty: Savage vs. Pareto. Games and Economic Behavior, 54(2), pp. 430-440. (doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2005.01.003)

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Following Mongin [J. Econ. Theory 66 (1995) 313; J. Math. Econ. 29 (1998) 331], we study social aggregation of subjective expected utility preferences in a Savage framework. We argue that each of Savage's P3 and P4 are incompatible with the strong Pareto property. A representation theorem for social preferences satisfying Pareto indifference and conforming to the state-dependent expected utility model is provided.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Hayashi, Professor Takashi
Authors: Chambers, C.P., and Hayashi, T.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
Journal Name:Games and Economic Behavior
Published Online:26 February 2005

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