Reasons and rational motivational access

Brady, M.S. (1998) Reasons and rational motivational access. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 79(2), pp. 99-114. (doi: 10.1111/1468-0114.00052)

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Practical Internalism holds that an agent's reasons for acting are entirely determined by his rational desires. This account is thought to be preferable to externalism, on the grounds that internalism alone can guarantee that agents have ‘rational motivational access’ (RMA) to their reasons. Rachel Cohon has recently argued that (i) internalism fails to ensure this, and (ii) an externalist account, akin to relativism, can guarantee RMA. I suggest that both of these claims are mistaken. I argue that relativism is best understood as an internalist theory, and claim that one version of internalism can therefore guarantee RMA.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Brady, Professor Michael
Authors: Brady, M.S.
College/School:College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
ISSN (Online):1468-0114
Published Online:17 December 2002

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