Burnside, C. (2002) On contingent liabilities and the likelihood of fiscal crises. Comparative Economic Studies, 44(1), pp. 1-14. (doi: 10.1057/ces.2002.2)
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Abstract
A contingent liability is a commitment to take on an actual liability that could be realized in the future. International organizations emphasize the dangers of contingent liabilities when providing advice. Why|[quest]| One reason is that when contingent liabilities are realized they often commit governments to substantial fiscal costs. Another reason is subtler: by taking on a contingent liability the government can increase the probability of the event that would trigger its realization. This paper focuses on a particular case: it describes the process by which government guarantees to bank creditors can make a banking system more fragile.
Item Type: | Articles |
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Status: | Published |
Refereed: | Yes |
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Burnside, Professor Craig |
Authors: | Burnside, C. |
College/School: | College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics |
Journal Name: | Comparative Economic Studies |
ISSN: | 0888-7233 |
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