Propositions and reasoning in Russell and Frege

Kemp, G. (1998) Propositions and reasoning in Russell and Frege. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 79(3), pp. 218-235. (doi: 10.1111/1468-0114.00059)

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Both Russell and Frege were inclined to think that there is nothing essentially linguistic about thought: any actual reliance of ours upon language is a mere psychological contingency. If so then it should be possible to formulate logic in such a way that logical relationships are not represented or expressed as principles pertaining to linguistic forms. Russell and Frege take pains to achieve this, but fail. I explain this by looking at some features of Grundgesetz and Principia. Their failure, I suggest, is due to the nature of the case.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Kemp, Dr Gary
Authors: Kemp, G.
College/School:College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
ISSN (Online):1468-0114
Published Online:17 December 2002

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