Kemp, G. (1998) Propositions and reasoning in Russell and Frege. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 79(3), pp. 218-235. (doi: 10.1111/1468-0114.00059)
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Abstract
Both Russell and Frege were inclined to think that there is nothing essentially linguistic about thought: any actual reliance of ours upon language is a mere psychological contingency. If so then it should be possible to formulate logic in such a way that logical relationships are not represented or expressed as principles pertaining to linguistic forms. Russell and Frege take pains to achieve this, but fail. I explain this by looking at some features of Grundgesetz and Principia. Their failure, I suggest, is due to the nature of the case.
| Item Type: | Articles |
|---|---|
| Status: | Published |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Kemp, Dr Gary |
| Authors: | Kemp, G. |
| College/School: | College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy |
| Journal Name: | Pacific Philosophical Quarterly |
| ISSN: | 0279-0750 |
| ISSN (Online): | 1468-0114 |
| Published Online: | 17 December 2002 |
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