Novel colours and the content of experience

Macpherson, F. (2003) Novel colours and the content of experience. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 84(1), pp. 43-66. (doi: 10.1111/1468-0114.00162)



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I propose a counterexample to naturalistic representational theories of phenomenal character. The counterexample is generated by experiences of novel colours reported by Crane and Piantanida. I consider various replies that a representationalist might make, including whether novel colours could be possible colours of objects and whether one can account for novel colours as one would account for binary colours or colour mixtures. I argue that none of these strategies is successful and therefore that one cannot fully explain the nature of the phenomenal character of perceptual experiences using a naturalistic conception of representation.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Macpherson, Professor Fiona
Authors: Macpherson, F.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BD Speculative Philosophy
College/School:College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
Publisher:Blackwell Publishing
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2003 University of Southern California and Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
First Published:First published in Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84(1):43-66
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher.

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