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'Feeling European': the view from Belarus,
Russia and Ukraine

JULIA KOROSTELEVA and STEPHEN WHITE
University of Glasgow, UK

Introduction

The Cold War defined two rival spheres of influence. No less important, it defined two sets of identities. Whether or not they shared its objectives, citizens of the communist-ruled countries in the east were part of a larger system of values, alliances and institutions. They were a 'socialist community' in which a distinctive way of life—collectivist and materialist—was supposed to be consolidating its influence. Their economies and political systems were interconnected; they shared the same external borders, and defended them in a co-ordinated way. If they went on holiday, it was to the Black Sea rather than the Mediterranean; if they drank wine, it would probably be Bulgarian; if they read a book in their own language or translation, it was more likely that the author was Gorky or Sholokhov than George Orwell or Solzhenitsyn (and certainly not the Bible). Nor were these impressions misleading. More than half of the USSR's foreign trade in the early 1980s, for instance, was with other communist ruled countries (54%, compared with 32% with the capitalist world), and foreign trade as a whole accounted less than 10% of the entire economy.¹

With the dismantling of the Berlin Wall, all these distinctions began to lose their earlier significance. Countries divided—the USSR, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia—or reunited (the two Germanys), and very different patterns of association began to establish themselves. Some of the newly independent states joined the European Union (EU) and NATO; others joined the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), established at the end of 1991 as the USSR itself dissolved. Six of the former Soviet republics set up a Collective Security Organization; five of them established a Eurasian Economic Community, and four of them—Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine—a 'Single Economic Space'. Belarus and Russia established the closest relationship of all with a 'Community' and then, in 1997, a more far-reaching 'Union', but elsewhere there were patterns of association that excluded Russia altogether, notably GUAM, which brought together Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova (and for a time Uzbekistan). Foreign trade reflected this greater diversity: by 2005, only 15% of Russia's foreign trade turnover was with the former Soviet republics that were members of the CIS, and more than half was with the EU. Belarus and Ukraine did rather more of their trade with CIS member countries, but here too the figures were in decline.²

Perhaps the most fundamental of these reorientations was in relation to 'Europe'. Geography hardly resolved the matter: the boundaries of 'Europe' had been drawn in different places at different times,³ and there were countries that straddled the geographical divide, most obviously Russia. Perhaps it was a matter of 'civilizations'? But although Huntington had emphasized the Christian/Islamic dichotomy more than any other, he also differentiated between the countries in the 'West' (which were marked out by individualism, the separation of church and state, the rule of law and a market economy) and a 'Slavic-Orthodox' civilization in the east, also Christian, but one in which church and state were related more closely and foreign domination had lasted much longer. Differences of this kind, Huntington suggested, were the 'product of centuries', and 'far more fundamental than differences among political ideologies

and political regimes'. Belarus and Ukraine were on both sides of this dividing line; Russia was also a 'torn country', wholly Orthodox but spread across two continents, and whether it was really 'European' or 'Asiatic' had been debated since at least the time of Pushkin's exchanges with Chadaev.⁴

In this article we seek to advance the discussion of these large and complex issues by focusing on self-perceptions in the three Slavic countries that have come to form the European Union's new 'neighbourhood': countries that share the same borders but which are located outside the framework of EU institutions, and which have their own patterns of association. We look first of all at European and other self-perceptions; we then examine the characteristics with which they are associated, including their distribution within countries as well as between them. In the final section we relate European self-perceptions to wider patterns, including political and economic values and party choice, in order to establish the extent to which a European orientation 'makes a difference'. We draw our evidence from national representative surveys conducted in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine between 2000 and 2005, which are themselves part of a wider inquiry that includes focus groups and elite interviews as well as the analysis of printed sources. Fuller details of the surveys are provided in the Appendix.⁵

'Feeling European'

We asked, first of all, if our respondents in the three countries thought of themselves as 'Europeans', and to what extent. Our results are set out in Table 1.

Table 1. European self-identity, 2000–2005 (percentage of respondents)

	Belarus		Russia			Ukraine	
	2000	2004	2000	2004	2005	2000	2004
To a significant extent	16	9	18	9	7	8	6
To some extent	34	25	34	21	18	26	20
Seldom	38	17	28	13	14	57	13
Not at all		37	19	47	54		49
N	2000	1599	1940	2000	2000	1590	2000

Source: authors' surveys (see Appendix).

Notes: Question wording was 'Do you think of yourself as a European?'. In 2000 the Belarusian and Ukrainian responses were 'often', 'sometimes' and 'never'. Figures show rounded percentages. Estimates exclude 'Don't know' and 'No answers', and therefore do not sum to 100%.

Several conclusions emerge. First of all, in every case European self-identity has been declining: most of all in Russia, but the same trends are apparent in the other two countries. About half of our Russian and Belarusian respondents in 2000 thought they were, at least to some extent, 'European', and more than a third of our Ukrainians thought the same. Five years later the proportions were down to a third (Belarus) or a quarter (Russia and Ukraine). Moreover, the largest shift of opinion—at least in Russia—had been towards those who felt they were 'not at all' European, who represented about half of all our Russian respondents in 2004–5. In every case, including Belarus, this was the most common response in 2004–5; by contrast, in 2000, in Russia, the largest single group of respondents had felt at least 'to some extent' European.

Identities are always multiple and polyvalent, and no single question is likely to yield a complete and unambiguous set of responses. Accordingly, in 2004–5 we asked a related set of questions using a wording modelled on the Eurobarometer, which allowed for a plurality of responses and provided results that could in principle be compared across the entire continent. Our results are set out in Table 2. Again, the main conclusions are clear. Overwhelmingly, in each country our respondents felt their first identity was as a citizen of that country. Almost to the same extent, our respondents felt they were citizens of their local area or settlement; regional identities were also popular; but relatively few thought of their identity as a European one, in the first or even second place. Belarusians, who had been somewhat more likely to think of themselves as ‘Europeans’, were also the most likely to identify themselves with a European identity. However, the numbers in every case were relatively low and, if anything, declining: in Russia and Ukraine, those who identified themselves as ‘European’ were fewer than those who still saw themselves as Soviet citizens a decade or more after the demise of the USSR.

Across the countries of the European Union, levels of identification with ‘Europe’ are considerably higher. The Eurobarometer asks routinely if respondents think of themselves as nationals of their own country, as Europeans, or as nationals of their own country and also Europeans. According to the exercise

Table 2. European vs. other self-identities, 2004–5

	Belarus	Russia		Ukraine
	2004	2004	2005	2004
European	16	10	8	10
Eurasian	2	6	3	2
Soviet citizen	10	13	13	11
Citizen of my country	72	76	76	69
Citizen of my region	18	29	29	27
From my settlement	65	69	69	69
N	1599	2000	2000	2000

Source: as Table 1.

Notes: Question wording was ‘Which of the following do you think of yourself to be first of all? And secondly?’ Figures show all who gave a corresponding response as their first or second choice, in rounded percentages. ‘Don’t know’ and ‘No answers’ account for residuals. Totals exceed 100% as a result of the aggregation of first and second choices.

that was fielded during the period of our surveys, 57% thought they had at least a partly European identity and 41% had only a national identity; a European identity of this kind ranged from 68% in France to 43% in the United Kingdom, and among 2004 EU entrants from 69% in Cyprus to 36% in Hungary. Although not precisely comparable, our own figures suggested a primary or secondary European identity in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine that was nowhere more than 16%, and a primary or secondary national identity that was nowhere less than 69%. These figures were not simply lower than those for all current and prospective EU member countries; they were also below those for Turkey, a largely Asian country with little immediate prospect of accession.⁶

Were these identities distributed randomly, or associated with particular sets of characteristics? We set out the evidence in Table 3, relating a variety of

socioeconomic circumstances to the three most distinctive and widely supported choices: ‘European’, ‘Soviet’ or ‘own country’. Those who thought of themselves as ‘Europeans’ in the first instance were somewhat more likely to be younger people; they tended to be male; and in Russia and Ukraine, they were likely to have higher levels of education. In Ukraine alone, they were likely to have higher (self-assessed) incomes. ‘Soviet citizens’, by contrast, were likely to be older, reflecting the years they had lived in what was still the USSR, with lower levels of education: more or less the inverse of ‘Europeans’. Those who indicated that they were ‘citizens of their own country’ in the first instance were broadly representative of the entire sample in terms of age. In Belarus they were more likely to be urban, and in Belarus and Russia they were less likely to have a lower level of education; in all three cases there was an association with higher levels of income. Overall, however, the differences across the three countries were relatively insignificant and not always symmetrical.

Table 3. European vs. other self-identities by socio-economic characteristics (SEC)

SEC	Belarus			Russia			Ukraine		
	EUR	SOV	OC	EUR	SOV	OC	EUR	SOV	OC
Male	8	6	46	4	6	49	5	8	43
Female	6	6	41	3	9	43	3	7	37
Under 30 years	9	2	46	5	3	49	5	2	43
60 or older	4	11	39	3	12	45	2	12	37
City	7	6	47	4	7	47	4	8	40
Rural	6	7	34	3	9	44	3	6	38
Primary education	6	10	32	1	13	39	1	9	36
Higher education	6	4	51	4	9	44	8	6	42
Low income	8	5	39	3	9	38	2	9	35
High income	8	5	52	4	6	52	10	4	48
Total	7	6	43	4	8	46	4	7	39

Source: as Table 1.

Notes: Question wording as Table 1, showing those who gave a corresponding response as their first choice, in rounded percentages, within each SEC for each country. ‘EUR’, ‘SOV’ and ‘OC’ denote, respectively, a ‘European’, ‘Soviet citizen’ or ‘citizen of my country’ option; ‘others’ (not shown) account for residuals. Cells highlighted in bold show a statistically significant association between the two variables, judged by the values of adjusted residuals (see R. Miller et al., *SPSS for Social Scientists*, Basingstoke/New York, 2002).

The regional dimension

Just as we would not expect ‘feeling European’ to be distributed randomly by socio-economic characteristics, we would not expect it to be distributed evenly across space. Russia sprawls across two continents, with most of its territory in Asia, although about three-quarters of its population lives in geographical Europe. To the west, it borders some of the European Union member countries; after the enlargement of 2004, taking in the three Baltic republics, its border with the EU roughly doubled in length. Regional differences are more pronounced in the other two countries, which lie on both sides of Huntington’s fault line: it separates an historical experience that has been more heavily influenced, in the east, by Orthodoxy, the Russian language and authoritarianism, and in the west by Catholicism, the Ukrainian language and more limited forms of government. Crimea, in the south, was a part of Russia until it was transferred arbitrarily to Ukrainian jurisdiction in 1954, and it remains

overwhelmingly Russian by language and nationality. A series of investigations has established that these differences are ‘contextual’ rather than ‘compositional’: that is, that they remain when other factors—such as social structure—have been taken into account.⁷

We relate these various differences to European and other self-perceptions in Table 4, separating Belarusian responses into an ‘east’, a ‘centre’ and a ‘west’, Russian responses into ‘Europe’ and ‘Asia’, and Ukrainian responses into ‘Crimea’, ‘east’, ‘centre’ and ‘west’.⁸ Regional differences, as these figures indicate, were very pronounced in Belarus and Ukraine: generally, the more westerly the region the more ‘European’ the responses, although the Ukrainian ‘south’ (Crimea) was the least ‘European’ of all, and this was also the area in which a regional self-identity was the most developed.⁹ In eastern Belarus and Ukraine, ‘Soviet citizens’ were more numerous than ‘Europeans’; in the west it was the other way round. Belarusians, overall, were more ‘European’ than Ukrainians. But the largest group in every case was likely to define themselves as ‘citizens of their own country’ or, in a few cases, of ‘their own settlement’.

We set out these spatial differences in graphic form in Figures 1 and 2, grouping together those who felt ‘to a significant’ or at least ‘to some extent European’.

Table 4. European and other self-identities by region

	Belarus 2004			Russia 2005			Ukraine 2004		
	East	Centre	West	Asia	Europe	Crimea	East	Centre	West
European	2	7	13	3	4	2	3	3	7
Eurasian	1	1	0	3	1	0	1	1	1
Soviet citizen	8	4	5	8	7	12	13	4	1
Citizen of my country	36	50	45	42	48	25	36	42	44
Citizen of my region	4	4	3	10	7	15	11	6	8
From my settlement	44	31	32	34	33	38	34	42	34
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: as Table 1.

Notes: Question wording was ‘Which of the following do you think of yourself to be first of all?’.

Figures show all those who gave a corresponding response as their first choice, in rounded percentages; ‘others’ account for residuals. Statistically significant associations are highlighted on the basis of adjusted residuals as in Table 3.




Figure 1. 'Feeling European' by region: Belarus and Ukraine.

Source: authors' surveys (see Appendix).

Notes: Question wording was 'Do you think of yourself as a European?'. Figures show rounded percentages of those who answered either 'feel a European to a significant extent' or 'to some extent'. The samples were designed using the proportional representation method where each administrative unit in each country was represented in the sample proportionally to its population size.

They show the same propensity for a 'European' self-identity to increase from east to west as we found with our question that allowed a choice of identities, with the lowest levels once again in the Crimea, and with Belarusian levels generally above those in the other two countries. Oddly, perhaps, there were lower levels of self-perceived 'Europeanness' in central than in eastern Ukraine; there had been little difference in our question that allowed a choice of identities.

There were more modest differences in Russia when we asked respondents to choose among a number of options: almost as many of our respondents who lived in Asia thought they were 'Europeans' as those who lived in geographical Europe. The same results emerged when we asked the question 'to what extent' our respondents felt European: in 2005, 7% of the entire sample 'felt European to a significant extent', and no more than 8% among those who lived in European Russia. This accords with other investigations, which have found 'no significant value differences at all' between respondents living to the east and to the west of the Urals; indeed, those who lived in Asiatic Russia were if anything more liberal—or in tune with modern European culture—than those who lived in European Russia.¹⁰

At lower levels of aggregation, however, the same patterns obtained as in the other two countries (see Figure 2). Once again there was a gradient from east to west, although not an entirely consistent one: residents of the Far East, for instance, were twice as likely to think of themselves as 'Europeans' as those who lived in the Siberian federal district. Siberians, in fact, were the least likely



Figure 2. 'Feeling European' by region: Russia.
Source/Notes: as per Figure 1.

to think of themselves as 'Europeans'; at the other extreme, those who lived in the central and north-western federal districts were more than three times as likely to do so. Residents of the Southern, Volga and Ural federal districts were in an intermediate position in terms of their propensity to see themselves as 'European', which is consistent with their position along the east-west gradient; residents of the southern federal district were also the most likely to be undecided.

Location is obviously associated with other differences, such as income and education. Does it still make a difference when factors of this kind have been taken into account? We set out the evidence in Figure 3, which shows the effect of 'region' when the socio-economic characteristics identified in Table 3 are held constant (for coding, see the note to Figure 3). The derived unstandardized coefficients of 'region' were equal to 0.273 in Belarus, 0.157 in Russia and 0.195 in Ukraine, showing the respective increase in 'feeling European' that would result from a unit increase in the regional factor. Estimated coefficients were then multiplied by the value of each region as defined in the note to Figure 3. This meant, for instance, that if a respondent lived in the western part of Belarus (scored as 3), it overall increased the level of European self-identification by approximately 0.8 (or, if compared with a respondent in the eastern part of Belarus, by approximately 0.5 ($0.273_3 - 0.273_1$)), holding all other variables constant.

Does 'Feeling European' make a difference?

As we have seen, 'feeling European' is distributed differentially across social groups and space; but differences of this kind are of no political significance unless 'feeling European' is associated with a distinctive distribution of views about the organization of public affairs, and particular forms of party politics. We consider some of this evidence in Table 5, relating a European self-perception to attitudes towards a market economy and towards a western-style political system in the first instance. Broadly, the relationship was as we had predicted: in every case, those who thought they were Europeans were more likely to




Figure 3. The effects of region on European self-identity (change in identity).

Source: as Table 1, 2004 surveys.

Notes: 'European self-identity' is coded from 1 ¼ 'don't think of myself as a European at all' to 5 ¼ 'think of myself as a European to a significant extent'. 'Region' is scored from 1 ¼ 'East' to 3 ¼ 'West' in the case of Belarus, from 1 ¼ 'East', 2 ¼ 'Centre' to 3 ¼ 'West' in the case of Ukraine (where 'Centre' also incorporates Crimea—see W. Miller, S. White and P. Heywood, *Values and Political Change in Postcommunist Europe*, London, 1998, p. 71 for the aggregation of regions), and from 1 ¼ Far Eastern, 2 ¼ Siberian, 3 ¼ Ural, 4 ¼ Volga, 5 ¼ Southern, 6 ¼ Central to 7 ¼ Northwestern in the case of Russian federal districts. The regions in each case are coded on the basis of their remoteness/closeness to the western border. The scale of the primary (left) axis reflects changes in the value of European self-identity in Belarus and Ukraine; the secondary (right) axis shows the same values for Russia.

support the principle of a market economy, and more likely to favour westernstyle democracy, but there was no more than an approximate fit. Indeed, across the three countries 31% of those who thought of themselves as Europeans opposed a market economy, and 40% supported a political system of the Soviet kind—views that were obviously some distance from the 'Copenhagen criteria' that define eligibility for membership of the European Union.

But was it 'Europeanness' that made the difference, rather than (for instance) income or education? We examine the relationship more closely in Table 6, which sets out the relationship between 'feeling European' and the same economic and political principles, and European Union and NATO membership, while controlling for the social characteristics that are considered in Table 3, including region. As our results suggest, a European self-perception has very similar effects across the region:

specifically, it is a significant predictor of support for a market economy, for western-style democracy, and for EU and NATO membership, when personal characteristics are held constant. Only in a single case, the effects of ‘feeling European’ on support for NATO membership in Russia,

Table 5. European self-identity, the market and politics

	Belarus			Russia			Ukraine		
	Don't feel	Feel	Total	Don't feel	Feel	Total	Don't feel	Feel	Total
Support for a market economy	57	64	57	43	56	45	45	54	45
Support for democracy	40	53	43	30	41	32	30	54	34

Source: as Table 1.

Notes: Question wording was ‘Do you think of yourself as a European?’. Statistically significant associations are highlighted on the basis of adjusted residuals as in Table 3. ‘Support for a market economy’ was derived from an arithmetic average of three variables (‘state property’ vs. ‘private property’, ‘income equality’ vs. ‘income according to merit’ and ‘guaranteed employment and low pay’ vs. ‘high pay but a risk of being fired’) and rescaled to a new scale from 1 (meaning support for a Soviet type of economy), 2 (neither) to 3 (meaning support for a market type of economy). The ‘support for democracy’ question was worded as ‘which of the following political systems is most appropriate for [country]?’. Partial or complete support for ‘democracy of the western type’ was counted as ‘support for democracy’. Figures show rounded percentages within columns for each question; estimates exclude ‘don’t knows’ and ‘no answers’, and therefore do not sum to 100.

was there no significant relationship; there were also some variations in the association between a European self-identity and support for a market economy, with a closer relationship in Russia than in the other two countries.

We were interested not simply in individual attitudes, but in the patterns of support across political space. Accordingly, we examined the association between a European self-identity and support for the variety of party families that have competed for electoral support within the region. As Table 7 suggests,

Table 6. Economic and political attitudes by European self-identity controlling for socioeconomic characteristics

Attitudinal variables	(Partial regression coefficients)		
	Belarus	Russia	Ukraine
Pro-market	0.044 (0.019)**	0.056 (0.016)***	0.033 (0.017)*
Pro-Western democracy	0.092 (0.025)***	0.069 (0.021)***	0.188 (0.024)***
Pro-EU	0.122 (0.018)***	0.085 (0.019)***	0.172 (0.017)***
Pro-NATO	0.077 (0.015)***	0.021 (0.015)	0.115 (0.014)***

Source: As Table 1, based on our 2004 Belarus and Ukraine and 2005 Russia surveys.

Notes: * statistically significant at p , 0.10; ** statistically significant at p , 0.05; *** statistically significant at p , 0.01, both two-tailed; standard errors are in brackets. ‘Pro-market’ is scaled from 0 ¼ pro-Soviet economy to 5 ¼ pro-market economy. ‘Prowestern democracy’ is scored from 1 ¼ pro-Soviet type of political system to 5 ¼ prowestern- style democracy. ‘Pro-EU’ and ‘pro-NATO’ are respectively scored from 1 ¼ least support to 5 ¼ most support for EU/NATO membership. European self-identity is coded from 1 ¼ ‘don’t think of myself as a European at all’ to 5 ¼ ‘think of myself as a European to a significant extent’. Controls are social-economic characteristics as defined in Table 3, including ‘region’.

there is at least one clear association: across all three countries, ‘feeling European’ is likely to be associated with support for a pro-market party—particularly so in Russia and Ukraine, less markedly so (although still statistically significant) in Belarus. Unexpectedly, perhaps, there was a much looser negative relationship between ‘feeling European’ and support for a communist party: only in Ukraine were those who thought of themselves as Europeans significantly less likely to support a communist party, and vice versa. In all three countries, however, there was another clear pattern, in that those who thought of themselves as Europeans were less reluctant than others to commit themselves one way or the other.

Again, was this a genuine or a spurious association? We tested this further by regressing each of the variables denoting support for a pro-market party and for a communist party on European self-identity while controlling for personal characteristics as defined in Table 3, including region. Table 8 presents the logistic regression results for all three countries. It shows that when socio-economic characteristics are taken into account, a European self-perception is statistically significant in predicting support for a pro-market party in Russia and Ukraine, but not in Belarus. The negative relationship between a European self-identity and support for a communist party was also confirmed, but only in Ukraine was there a statistically significant association when socio-economic characteristics were held constant.

Some conclusions

Self-identified ‘Europeans’, on our evidence, are a small but distinctive minority. They are more likely to be male, and aged under 30 years; in Russia and Ukraine they are better educated, and in Ukraine they are likely to think of themselves as having a higher income. ‘Europeans’ are more likely to live in the western parts of the countries in which they are resident; ‘Soviet citizens’ are more numerous in the east. Belarusians, on the whole, are more likely to identify themselves as Europeans. These were patterns that remained whether we asked respondents if they ‘felt European’, or whether they were allowed to opt for a ‘European’

Table 7. Party preference by European self-identity

	Belarus			Russia			Ukraine		
	Don’t feel	Feel	Total	Don’t feel	Feel	Total	Don’t feel	Feel	Total
Support for a pro-market party	13	17	13	21	31	23	16	27	18
Support for a communist	7	7	7	14	12	14	25	14	23

party									
None (a)	68	59	68	44	38	43	34	25	33

Source: As Table 1, 2004 Belarus and Ukraine surveys and 2005 Russia survey.

Notes: 'Don't feel' and 'feel a European' include all who 'to some' or 'to a significant extent' associated themselves with the question. Cells highlighted in bold show a statistically significant association between two variables, judged by the values of adjusted residuals, as in Table 3.

(a) Includes 'don't knows' and 'no response' as well as 'none'.

Table 8. Party family support by European self-identity, controlling for socio-economic characteristics (logistic regression results)

	Parameter estimates (standard errors)		
	Belarus	Russia	Ukraine
Support for a pro-market party	0.030 (0.053)	0.133 (0.039)***	0.163 (0.043)***
Support for a pro-communist party	20.014 (0.074)	20.040 (0.051)	20.138 (0.046)***

Source: As Table 1, based on our 2004 Belarus and Ukraine and 2005 Russia surveys.

Notes: * statistically significant at p , 0.10; ** statistically significant at p , 0.05; *** statistically significant at p , 0.01, both two-tailed; standard errors are in brackets. The dependent variable in each case is scaled as 1 denoting support and 0, other values. European self-identity is coded from 1 ¼ 'don't think of myself as a European at all' to 5 ¼ 'think of myself as a European to a significant extent'. Controls are socio-economic characteristics as defined in Table 3, including 'region'.

identity within a wider repertoire; and they remained when we took social and economic circumstances, and region, into account.

We also found that 'feeling European' made a difference. Other things being equal, 'Europeans' were more likely to support a market economy and western democracy, and EU and NATO membership. Only in a single case, the effects of 'feeling European' on support for NATO membership in Russia, was there no significant relationship; there were also some variations in the association between a European self-identity and support for a market economy, with a closer relationship in Russia than in the other two countries. We found in addition that a European self-identity had significant effects in predicting party support, even when social and economic circumstances were taken into account. A European self-identity was significant in predicting support for a pro-market party in Russia and Ukraine, but not in Belarus; and it was significant in predicting a lack of support for a communist party in Ukraine, but not in the other two countries.

If levels of European self-identity have important consequences, it becomes still more important to understand what predicts a European self-identity in the first place. As well as the factors considered in this paper, it is likely that the European Union will make a direct contribution of its own depending on whether it includes or excludes, encouraging or obstructing the flow of people, goods, services and ideas across the new border with its immediate neighbourhood without necessarily providing a membership perspective. Identities are not 'givens', and a European identity in particular has little to do with formal boundaries and much more to do with interaction with the outside world,

levels of prosperity and legality, and membership of wider frameworks of association.¹¹ In that continuous process of negotiation, a European self-identity has distinct effects but can itself be shaped.

Notes

1. Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR v 1982 g., Moscow, 1983, pp. 45, 532, 534.
2. For the Russian figures, see www.gks.ru; the Belarusian and Ukrainian figures (64 and 39%, respectively) are derived from *Sodruzhestvo nezavisimykh gosudarstv v 2004 g.: statisticheskii ezhegodnik*, Moscow, 2004, various pages.
3. See L. Wolff, *Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment*, Stanford, CA, 1994.
4. S. Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilizations?', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 3, 1993, pp. 22–49 (pp. 29–31, 43–4). For a survey of these discussions, see, for instance, I. Neumann, *Russia and the Idea of Europe: A Study in Identity and International Relations*, London, 1995; J. Billington, *Russia in Search of Itself*, Washington, DC, 2004; and N. Riasanovsky, *Russian Identities: A Historical Survey*, New York, 2005.
5. Further details are available on the project website, <http://www.lbss.gla.ac.uk/politics/inclusionwithoutmembership/index/html>.
6. See Eurobarometer, No. 62, 2005, pp. 94–6, consulted at www.europa.eu.int, accessed 22 March 2006.
7. See, for instance, W. Zimmerman, 'Is Ukraine a Political Community?', *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, Vol. 31, No. 1, 1998, pp. 43–55; S. Birch, 'Interpreting the Regional Effect in Ukrainian Politics', *Europe–Asia Studies*, Vol. 52, No. 6, 2000, pp. 1017–41; S. Shulman, 'The Contours of Civic and Ethnic National Identification in Ukraine', *Europe–Asia Studies*, Vol. 56, No. 1, January 2004, pp. 35–56.
8. In Belarus we defined Vitebsk and Mogilev regions as the 'east'; Minsk city, Minsk and Gomel regions as the 'centre'; and Brest and Grodno as the 'west'. In Ukraine 'Crimea' defined itself; we allocated eastern regions including south- and north-eastern regions to the 'east'; Kyiv city, Kyiv region and northern and southern regions to the 'centre'; and western regions including south- and north-western regions to the 'west'.
9. The special circumstances of the Crimea have recently been considered in I. Katchanovski, 'Small Nations but Great Differences: Political Orientations and Cultures of the Crimean Tatars and the Gagauz', *Europe–Asia Studies*, Vol. 57, No. 6, 2005, pp. 877–94.
10. W. Miller, S. White and P. Heywood, *Values and Political Change in Postcommunist Europe*, London, 1998, pp. 14, 28.

11. Perspectives of this kind are explored in F. Splidsboel-Hansen, 'Russia's Relations with the European Union: a Constructionist Cut', *International Politics*, Vol. 39, No. 4, December 2002, pp. 399–421, and more generally in L. Cederman (ed.), *Constructing Europe's Identity: The External Factor*, Boulder, CO, 2001.

Appendix

Our surveys were conducted by Russian Research in association with the project on 'Inclusion without Membership? Bringing Russia, Ukraine and Belarus closer to "Europe"', directed by Stephen White, Margot Light and Roy Allison and funded by the UK Economic and Social Research Council under grant RES-000-23-0146. In Russia, fieldwork took place between 21 December 2003 and 16 January 2004 and again between 23 March and 20 April 2005. The number of respondents in each case was 2000, selected according to the agency's normal sampling procedures; it was representative of the population aged 18 and over, using a multi-stage proportional method with a random route method of selecting households. Interviews were conducted face to face in respondents' homes. The sample was then weighted in accordance with sex, age and education in each region. In both cases there were 97 sampling points, and 150 interviewers were employed; the agency's standard procedures were employed to check the completion of questionnaires and the logical consistency of the data.

In Belarus, our survey was conducted under the auspices of the same agency between 27 March and 18 April 2004. The number of respondents was 1597, selected according to the agency's normal sampling procedures; it was representative of the population aged 18 and over, using a multi-stage proportional representation method with a random route method of selecting households. Interviews were conducted face to face in respondents' homes; the response rate was 66%. The sample was then weighted in accordance with sex and age in each region, using the 1999 census adjusted on the basis of expert estimates as of the start of 2003. There were 288 sampling points, and 120 interviewers were employed; 10% of the interviews were selected randomly for checking.

In Ukraine, our survey was conducted under the auspices of the same agency between 23 March and 2 April 2004. The number of respondents was 2000, selected according to the agency's normal sampling procedures; it was representative of the population aged 18 and over, using a multi-level, stratified method with a random method of selection at the final stage. Interviews were conducted face to face in respondents' homes; the response rate was 67%. The sample was then weighted in accordance with sex and age in each region. There were 259 sampling points, and 187 interviewers were employed; 10% of the interviews were selected randomly for checking.