Epsilon cores of games with limited side payments: Nonemptiness and equal treatment

Kovalenkov, A. and Wooders, M.H. (2001) Epsilon cores of games with limited side payments: Nonemptiness and equal treatment. Games and Economic Behavior, 36(2), pp. 193-218. (doi: 10.1006/game.2000.0815)

Abstract

We introduce the concept of a parameterized collection of games with limited side payments, ruling out large transfers of utility, and demonstrate conditions ensuring that a game with limited side payments has a nonempty ^∈-core. Our main result is that, when some degree of side-paymentness within nearly-effective small groups is assumed and large transfers are prohibited, then all payoffs in the ^∈-core treat similar players similarly. A bound on the distance between ^∈-core payoffs of any two similar players is given in terms of the parameters describing the game. These results add to the literature showing that games with many players and small effective groups have the properties of competitive markets.

• Item Type: Articles
• Status: Published
• Refereed: Yes
• Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: Kovalenkov, Dr Alexander
• Authors: Kovalenkov, A., and Wooders, M.H.
• College/School: College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
• Journal Name: Games and Economic Behavior
• Publisher: Academic Press
• ISSN: 0899-8256
• ISSN (Online): 1090-2473
• Published Online: 04 March 2002