Approximate cores of games and economies with clubs

Kovalenkov, A. and Wooders, M. (2003) Approximate cores of games and economies with clubs. Journal of Economic Theory, 110(1), pp. 87-120. (doi: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00003-6)

Full text not currently available from Enlighten.

Publisher's URL:


We introduce the framework of parameterized collections of games with and without sidepayments and provide three nonemptiness of approximate core theorems. The parameters bound (a) the number of approximate types of players and the size of the approximation and (b) the size of nearly effective groups of players and their distance from exact effectiveness. Our theorems are based on a new notion of partition-balanced profiles and approximately partition-balanced profiles. The results are applied to a new model of an economy with clubs. In contrast to the extant literature, our approach allows both widespread externalities and uniform results. A fundamental new mathematical result, the partition-balancing effect of large numbers, which promises to have further applications, is contained in Appendix A.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Kovalenkov, Dr Alexander
Authors: Kovalenkov, A., and Wooders, M.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
Journal Name:Journal of Economic Theory
ISSN (Online):1095-7235
Published Online:01 May 2003

University Staff: Request a correction | Enlighten Editors: Update this record