Simple strategy-proof approximately Walrasian mechanisms

Kovalenkov, A. (2002) Simple strategy-proof approximately Walrasian mechanisms. Journal of Economic Theory, 103(2), pp. 475-487. (doi: 10.1006/jeth.2000.2788)

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This note provides an indirect analysis of the incentive properties of the Walrasian mechanism. It presents mechanisms under which truth-telling is a dominant strategy in finite exchange economies (in contrast to the Walrasian mechanism) and whose outcomes (generically) approximate Walrasian ones for large economies. These mechanisms provide new insights on the well-know trade-off between efficiency and incentive compatibility in finite economies.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Kovalenkov, Dr Alexander
Authors: Kovalenkov, A.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
Journal Name:Journal of Economic Theory
ISSN (Online):1095-7235
Published Online:12 April 2002

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