Kovalenkov, A. (2002) Simple strategy-proof approximately Walrasian mechanisms. Journal of Economic Theory, 103(2), pp. 475-487. (doi: 10.1006/jeth.2000.2788)
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Publisher's URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2000.2788
Abstract
This note provides an indirect analysis of the incentive properties of the Walrasian mechanism. It presents mechanisms under which truth-telling is a dominant strategy in finite exchange economies (in contrast to the Walrasian mechanism) and whose outcomes (generically) approximate Walrasian ones for large economies. These mechanisms provide new insights on the well-know trade-off between efficiency and incentive compatibility in finite economies.
| Item Type: | Articles |
|---|---|
| Status: | Published |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Kovalenkov, Dr Alexander |
| Authors: | Kovalenkov, A. |
| College/School: | College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics |
| Journal Name: | Journal of Economic Theory |
| Publisher: | Elsevier |
| ISSN: | 0022-0531 |
| ISSN (Online): | 1095-7235 |
| Published Online: | 12 April 2002 |
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